From a77cba492c414399a79de69a8ac539f70b1e31d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: helix-nine <267227783+helix-nine@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Wed, 12 Aug 2026 10:05:32 -0600 Subject: [PATCH] document the unauthenticated endpoints, drop TODO.md for issues MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Nothing on the proxy is authenticated, so whoever can reach the port can spend the user's PPQ.AI balance — true of every version, and not something either doc said. Enabling PPQ_DATA_DIR adds a second unauthenticated route, POST /setup/api-key, which replaces the stored key (upstream PayPerQ/ppq-private-mode-proxy#23). README states both and whose each is; instructions.md tells the user plainly to expose the interface only to people they trust, which is the part they can act on. TODO.md is deleted rather than emptied. Its live-inference item is closed — PayPerQ confirmed billed end-to-end against glm-5-2 and llama3-3-70b — and the other two are now issues #2 (backup/restore, unverified: it needs the server password, and the 0.4 file split gives it two new ways to fail) and #3 (bump when the auth patch lands, and retract the warnings it makes false). The scaffold's worklist has been worked; a file left behind to say so is not worth reading. --- README.md | 10 ++++++++++ TODO.md | 8 -------- instructions.md | 7 +++++++ 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 TODO.md diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index e580eab..4c68871 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -107,6 +107,16 @@ Two interfaces on one HTTP host, port 8787, both served by the proxy: Availability on LAN/Tor is decided by the user from the interface panel. +**No endpoint is authenticated.** Upstream ships no auth on any route, so +whoever can reach the port can spend the user's PPQ.AI balance via +`/v1/chat/completions`, and — because this package sets `PPQ_DATA_DIR` — can +also replace the stored key via `POST /setup/api-key` +([upstream #23](https://github.com/PayPerQ/ppq-private-mode-proxy/issues/23)). +The billing exposure predates that endpoint and is inherent to the proxy; the +key-replacement one is enabled by our `PPQ_DATA_DIR` choice, and closes when +upstream's patch lands and this package bumps to it. `instructions.md` warns +the user to expose the interface accordingly. + ## Actions (StartOS UI) - **Configure PPQ API Key** (`configure-api-key`) — visible and enabled at any diff --git a/TODO.md b/TODO.md deleted file mode 100644 index 3ef3ade..0000000 --- a/TODO.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,8 +0,0 @@ -# TODO — remaining work before release - -- [ ] Run one live inference request with a funded PPQ.AI key. Everything up to - the enclave is verified (attestation, encrypted forward, error handling), - but no request has yet been billed end-to-end against a real key. -- [ ] Re-run backup and restore on a StartOS box: back up, uninstall, restore, - and confirm the service comes back with its key and raises no - configuration task. diff --git a/instructions.md b/instructions.md index a0d44f6..6afbf8c 100644 --- a/instructions.md +++ b/instructions.md @@ -74,5 +74,12 @@ you already saved. ## Limitations +**The proxy has no login of its own, so only expose it to people you trust.** +Anyone who can reach the address can send requests that are billed to your +PPQ.AI key, and can replace the stored key from the Status Page. On a LAN-only +address that means everyone on your network; if you enable a Tor or public +address, it means anyone with the address. Keeping it on the LAN, or on Tor with +the address kept private, is the safe default. + Backups of this service include your saved API key, and restoring a backup restores it — keep that in mind when handling backup drives.