docs: record the answers to section 26.8 in the handover note
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@@ -22,14 +22,14 @@ Read section 26 of `TODO.md` for the full list. The parts that are easy to get w
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- **A key with an open alert cannot get a new check.** The form must name the alert that blocks the key and the action that closes it, and must show which keys are free. The server enforces it with `409`, so a direct API call cannot bypass the rule. The blocking applies to that key only.
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- **Every alert must stay closable.** An alert must always carry at least one action, or the key would be locked with no way out. An alert without an action is a bug, not a state the user can reach.
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- **The merge rule of section 21 stays as it is.** An alert from an older check is not cleared by a newer check that raises nothing, which is exactly why closing the alert is the way out and why the blocking rule is needed.
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- **The address path must be unique across the three keys.** Section 25 allowed the same path for two keys; section 26.2 does not. The comparison happens after `strip` and without regard to case. The setup answers `400`, the settings `409`, and the rotation `400`. An older test database may already hold a duplicate: the app must not crash, the settings must show which keys collide, and a check for such a key is refused until the path is changed.
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- **The address path must be unique across the three keys.** Section 25 allowed the same path for two keys; section 26.2 does not. The comparison happens after `strip` and without regard to case. The setup answers `400`, the settings `409`, and the rotation `400`. No legacy handling is needed: the app is still under development, the user deletes the `data` folder and configures the setup again, so a duplicate cannot survive.
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- **A rotation now requires a new address path.** Section 25 asked the user to confirm that the path was unchanged; section 26.3 replaces that with a required, unique, new path, because the rotation replaces the key. The key number stays, the name may be kept or changed (the field is pre-filled with the current name), and `address_path_unchanged` disappears from the API.
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- **Every alert code has its own actions.** The generic `acknowledge` is replaced by `rotate`, `replace_hardware`, `remove_software`, `ignore`, and `contact_updated`, each with its own button text and confirmation step. `POST /api/alerts/acknowledge` takes the action instead of a free reason and stores the action name as the reason. See the table in section 26.4 for which code offers what.
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- **Every alert code has its own actions.** The generic `acknowledge` is replaced by `rotate`, `replace_hardware`, `remove_software`, `ignore`, and `contact_updated`, each with its own button text and confirmation step. `POST /api/alerts/acknowledge` takes the action instead of a free reason and stores the action name as the reason. See the table in section 26.4 for which code offers what. `security_compromised` has **no** `ignore`, whether the source is the key or the software: a key-sourced one can only be rotated, and a software-sourced one can only be closed by removing that software.
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- **`hardware_failure` closes with `replace_hardware`**, which is not a rotation: the user buys new hardware and restores the same seed, so the key and the address path stay the same. That is why the alert no longer needs a generic acknowledgement.
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- **`software_incompatible` closes by removing the failing software from the settings list.** The alert must name the software that produced the result, so the link and the removal point at the right entry. If it is the only entry, the user must add a replacement first, because the list may never be empty (section 25.4). The same message, link and removal apply to `security_vulnerable` and `security_compromised` when the software is the source. The recommended mechanism is to suppress the alert while the failing software is no longer in the list.
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- **`software_incompatible` closes by removing the failing software from the settings list.** The alert must name the software that produced the result, so the link and the removal point at the right entry. The alert carries a link to the settings, and when the list holds more than one name it also offers a plain button that removes the failing software straight from the alert. If it is the only entry, the user must add a replacement first, because the list may never be empty (section 25.4). The same message, link and removal apply to a software-sourced `security_vulnerable`.
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- **The dashboard key card must show the open alert.** Today it shows its ordinary status, such as `Up to date`; a key with an open alert must instead show a clear message that the key needs action, and how many alerts are open.
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- **One CSS fix.** In `03 / Key rotation`, `div.warning-note` sits too close to `div.rotation-list`. Only the spacing changes.
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- **Three questions are still open for the user** (section 26.8): how an older database with two identical paths is handled, whether `ignore` also applies to a software-sourced `security_compromised`, and which mechanism closes `software_incompatible` when the software is removed.
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- **The three questions of section 26.8 are answered** (04.10.2026): no legacy-database handling, no `ignore` on `security_compromised`, and `software_incompatible` closes by removing the software in the settings. Tests cover everything section 26 implements, and nothing that is removed. `README.md`, `TODO.md` and `ai-note.md` are updated when section 26 is done, or as the work is split up.
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## Section 25 — implemented and verified
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