Close section 32.8 point 7 and record the admin-task outcome
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@@ -11,37 +11,42 @@ Short working handover for the next model. Keep it short.
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## Status
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- **Done and verified:** everything through §32.7, plus §32.8 stages A, B and C. Schema version **13**.
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- **Done and verified:** everything through §32.8, point 7 included. Schema version **13**.
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**532 green tests.** The StartOS package is built, sideloaded and running on a StartOS 0.4.0 box;
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the package version is still `0.1.0:0`.
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- **What is left, in this order:** **§32.8 point 7** (the user's manual end-to-end pass — see below),
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then **§32.6** (the documentation drift), then **§32.5** (the raise to `1.0.0:0` with §18 step 12).
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32.6 has to come after the rounds it documents, and 32.5 last.
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- **The required admin task is settled.** `startos/init/requireAdmin.ts` raises it with severity
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`critical`, and the box test on a fresh volume shows it as *required* and holding the service back
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until the admin password is set. With `important` it only showed as *recommended*, which was the
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deviation §32.8 point 7 found. No deviation is left to document.
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- **What is left, in this order:** **§32.6** (the documentation drift), then **§32.5** (the raise to
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`1.0.0:0` with §18 step 12). 32.6 has to come after the rounds it documents, and 32.5 last.
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- **A round stops when it is done.** Do not start the next item unless the user asks.
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- **Verified how:** the automated suite, the user's manual browser testing, and the install and test
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round on a StartOS 0.4.0 box. **The user runs the suite; the agent has no shell.**
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- **Tests:** `python3 -m unittest discover -s tests`. They run on a Windows copy at
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`C:\Users\<brukarnamn>\Downloads\helsesjekk`, so they must pass there as well as on Linux.
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## §32.8 point 7 — the one open item
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## §32.8 point 7 — done and confirmed by the user
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The user's manual end-to-end pass (BR-003). It covers: first setup and the mandatory admin step;
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login and logout; an expired or invalid session; a direct API call without a session; one full check
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and the CSV export; another threshold and key count; deleting all data with the confirmation;
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restart, backup and restore; PWA offline and online, also after logout; plus the six finished points
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(future date rejected, sticky top bar, the login lockout, the admin task, a rotation that does not
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change older history, and software closures in the history and the CSV).
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The user's manual end-to-end pass (BR-003) ran on the box and came out as expected: first setup and
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the mandatory admin step; login and logout; an expired or invalid session; a direct API call without
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a session; one full check and the CSV export; another threshold and key count; deleting all data with
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the confirmation; restart, backup and restore; the six finished points (future date rejected, sticky
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top bar, the login lockout, the admin task, a rotation that does not change older history, and
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software closures in the history and the CSV); the CSRF test; and the PWA offline and online, also
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after logout.
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**Run so far, on the box:** everything above is OK except three things.
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- **The required task does not hold the service back.** `Set Admin Password` shows on Tasks as
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*recommended*, so the user can start the app without an admin. That is a deviation from §32.8
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point 1, which asks for a task the user cannot skip. The decision is open: try a stricter severity
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in `startos/init/requireAdmin.ts` and re-test on the box, or accept the deviation and document what
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actually happens in §32.6. SDK 3.0.4 has no `TaskCondition` for "the admin password is unset".
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- **The CSRF test is not run yet:** a `POST` to `/api/settings/wallet-software` with the session
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cookie but **without** the `X-CSRF-Token` header must answer `403`, and must not store anything.
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- **PWA offline and online after logout** is not confirmed yet.
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- **The CSRF test:** a `POST` to `/api/settings/wallet-software` with the session cookie but without
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the `X-CSRF-Token` header answers `403` and stores nothing; with the token copied from the
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`vardkey_csrf` cookie it answers `200`. **Do not hand out a plain `fetch` for this test:**
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`static/session.js` replaces `window.fetch` and injects the header, so the call answers `200` and
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looks like a bug that is not there. Use `XMLHttpRequest` from an application page instead —
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`/login` cannot be used as the console context, because `login.js` loads no `session.js` but sends a
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signed-in user straight back to `/`.
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- **The PWA:** offline the cached shell loads and the dashboard shows the "You are offline" state
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instead of stale data, because `/api/*` is never cached; back online the page reloads itself and the
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data returns; after signing out, `/` offline still serves the cached dashboard shell and not the
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login page. `isCacheable()` is what guarantees the last one. No code change was needed.
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One expectation in the run was wrong, and the app is right: a key with a **software-sourced**
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`software_incompatible` is **not** blocked in the key select, because that alert carries no `key_id`.
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@@ -325,8 +330,10 @@ volume, mounted at `/data`. No Postgres, no Redis, no external backend, no extra
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generates it there and prints it.
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- **The required task** from §32.8 point 1 lives in `startos/init/requireAdmin.ts` and keeps the same
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property: no password travels from the host into the container. It raises and clears the task itself,
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because SDK 3.0.4 has no condition for "the admin password is unset". The probe fails open. Its
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behaviour on the box is still open — see §32.8 point 7 above.
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because SDK 3.0.4 has no condition for "the admin password is unset". The probe fails open. The
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severity is `critical`, the strictest the SDK offers, and the box test on a fresh volume shows the
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task as required and holding the service back until the admin password is set — with `important` it
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only showed as *recommended*.
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- **Backups.** `startos/backups.ts` is `sdk.Backups.ofVolumes('main')`. StartOS stops the service for
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the duration of a backup, so the database file is quiescent while it is copied — no snapshot hook is
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needed.
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@@ -480,6 +487,13 @@ volume, mounted at `/data`. No Postgres, no Redis, no external backend, no extra
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`database_path="data/vardkey.sqlite3"` as the default of every storage function (fifteen of them),
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and `app.py` carries it in `get_database_path()`. A missed one makes a single code path read or
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create the other file, silently.
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- **A browser test of a missing CSRF header must not use `fetch`.** `static/session.js` replaces
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`window.fetch` and adds `X-CSRF-Token` to every same-origin call unless the header is already set, so
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a `fetch(...)` in the console answers `200` and proves nothing. Use `XMLHttpRequest` from one of the
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five application pages: it is not patched, it sends the cookies same-origin, and the server answers
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`403` without the header. A header with a wrong value also answers `403`, because `session.js` never
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overwrites a header that is already there. `/login` cannot host the test: `login.js` loads no
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`session.js`, but it sends a signed-in user back to `/` from `/api/session`.
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## Tooling — what the agent can and cannot do
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