# AI Agent Note — VardKey Short working handover for the next model. Keep it short. - `TODO.md` (Norwegian) is the requirement specification: §1–§18 are binding and describe the app as it is now, §19–§32 are history as one line each, and §32 holds only what is left. The full reasoning is in the git history. - The binding rules live in `TODO.md` and `README.md`. This note does not repeat them — it carries the handover, the rules that are easy to get wrong, and the traps that already cost time. - `HANDOVER.md` and `ai-thought.md` were deleted as outdated. Do not recreate either. ## Status - **Done and verified:** everything through §32.7, plus §32.8 stages A, B and C. Schema version **13**. **532 green tests.** The StartOS package is built, sideloaded and running on a StartOS 0.4.0 box; the package version is still `0.1.0:0`. - **What is left, in this order:** **§32.8 point 7** (the user's manual end-to-end pass — see below), then **§32.6** (the documentation drift), then **§32.5** (the raise to `1.0.0:0` with §18 step 12). 32.6 has to come after the rounds it documents, and 32.5 last. - **A round stops when it is done.** Do not start the next item unless the user asks. - **Verified how:** the automated suite, the user's manual browser testing, and the install and test round on a StartOS 0.4.0 box. **The user runs the suite; the agent has no shell.** - **Tests:** `python3 -m unittest discover -s tests`. They run on a Windows copy at `C:\Users\\Downloads\helsesjekk`, so they must pass there as well as on Linux. ## §32.8 point 7 — the one open item The user's manual end-to-end pass (BR-003). It covers: first setup and the mandatory admin step; login and logout; an expired or invalid session; a direct API call without a session; one full check and the CSV export; another threshold and key count; deleting all data with the confirmation; restart, backup and restore; PWA offline and online, also after logout; plus the six finished points (future date rejected, sticky top bar, the login lockout, the admin task, a rotation that does not change older history, and software closures in the history and the CSV). **Run so far, on the box:** everything above is OK except three things. - **The required task does not hold the service back.** `Set Admin Password` shows on Tasks as *recommended*, so the user can start the app without an admin. That is a deviation from §32.8 point 1, which asks for a task the user cannot skip. The decision is open: try a stricter severity in `startos/init/requireAdmin.ts` and re-test on the box, or accept the deviation and document what actually happens in §32.6. SDK 3.0.4 has no `TaskCondition` for "the admin password is unset". - **The CSRF test is not run yet:** a `POST` to `/api/settings/wallet-software` with the session cookie but **without** the `X-CSRF-Token` header must answer `403`, and must not store anything. - **PWA offline and online after logout** is not confirmed yet. One expectation in the run was wrong, and the app is right: a key with a **software-sourced** `software_incompatible` is **not** blocked in the key select, because that alert carries no `key_id`. Do not "fix" that. ## The wallet-secret guard (round 32-B) `secret_guard.py` is the one place that decides whether a piece of text looks like a wallet secret. It is local (no network call), silent (the text never reaches a log, a message or an exception) and narrow (it matches only the shapes that are unmistakable, so an ordinary note is not refused). - **What it recognises:** a PEM private-key block; an extended private key with any SLIP-132 prefix (`xprv`, `yprv`, `zprv`, `tprv`, `uprv`, `vprv`) at 100 base58 characters or more; a WIF key (51 or 52 base58 characters starting `5`, `9`, `K`, `L` or `c`); a BIP38 key (`6P`, 58 characters); and a run of 12 or more consecutive BIP39 words, also in the middle of a sentence. It returns a short English label such as `"a seed phrase"`, never the value, and `rejection_message(field, label)` never repeats it either. - **The wordlist is embedded**, 2048 words, from `bitcoin/bips` `bip-0039/english.txt`. `tests/test_secret_guard.py` checks it: 2048 words, alphabetical, 3–8 lower-case letters, and no two words sharing their first four letters. That last check is the strong one. Do not edit the list without that test. - **Where it is wired in:** `validation.py` calls `_reject_secret()` from the four text helpers `_text`, `_key_name`, `_model` and `_required_path`, so every free-text field is covered by construction. `auth.py` checks the admin username the same way; the password is deliberately not checked, because a long passphrase is a legitimate password. - **The refusal is a `ValidationError`** (`SecretDetected`), so the existing handlers answer `400`. `app.py` needed no change at all — do not add a handler for this. A plain `ValueError` would have been caught by `STORAGE_ERRORS` and answered `500`. - **The guard runs before the field's length limit.** A seed phrase pasted into a 60-character label field is answered with "looks like a seed phrase", not with "too long". **This order is deliberate and pinned by tests; do not swap it back.** - **The reminder in the UI is one line, in the key setup** — a single `p.secret-warning` above the whole key list in `static/setup.html`, and nowhere else. The page notice is a different thing and stays on `health-check.html`, `setup.html` and `settings.html`. The server side is unchanged. - **The limitations are documented in the module docstring and are not to be played down:** a bare 64-character hex string is not refused (it is indistinguishable from a transaction id); only the English wordlist is used; a secret split across several fields, or in a shape outside the patterns, is not caught; and a false positive is possible for a note that happens to be twelve or more BIP39 words in a row. ## Alerts, closures and key identity — the parts that are easy to get wrong The rules are in `TODO.md` §7; these are the traps that have already cost time. - **The acknowledgement stores the key.** `alert_acknowledgements.key_id` is nullable and holds the key the alert belonged to, or `NULL` for a software alert raised by the settings list. An alert with a key is acknowledged and hidden by `(code, key_id)`; an alert without one stays on `(code, source)`. This closed a real bug: a rename — or a `rotate` with `keep_name=false` — used to reopen a closed alert, because `source` carries the name the key has *now*. - **A key-sourced security alert carries `Key N: `, and the row decides.** `build_alerts()` reads the key checks into a lookup by key id, and `_security_alerts()` looks the row's own `key_id` up in it. When the row carries the checked key, the key is the source and the alert belongs to it, so it is closed by a rotation; otherwise the source is the plain software name and it is closed by removing that software from the settings. **The provider name is never compared with the names that are configured now**, so a rename or a rotation cannot turn a key alert into a software one. `rotation_alert_targets()`, `software_alert_targets()` and `newest_alert_check_id()` all read the same `build_alerts()`, so they see the same source, which is what keeps an alert closable. - **The contact alert belongs to the checked key.** It gets `key_id` and `source` = `Key N: `, and its message says "this key". The severity stays `info` and the action stays `contact_updated`. It blocks its key like every other key alert, because `blocking_alert()` and the `blockingAlerts` filter in the form only look at `key_id`. - **`software_incompatible` has two forms.** A software from the settings list keeps `source` = the software name, `key_id` = `None`, actions `[remove_software]`, and carries `software`. A wallet software that is the name of a configured cloud key can never be removed from the settings, so that form belongs to the checked key instead: `key_id` = the checked key, `source` = `Key N: `, actions `[replace_hardware]`, and **no** `software` value, so a settings removal can never close it. Only that form names the software in its message, because its source is the key. - **`alerts.py` still needs the cloud key names, but only for `software_incompatible`.** `build_alerts()` and `collect_alerts()` take `cloud_names=()`, threaded through `rotation_alert_targets()`, `software_alert_targets()`, and the four call sites in `app.py` (`_send_alerts`, `_blocking_alert`, `_rotate_key`, `_close_removed_software`), plus `newest_alert_check_id()`. `app.cloud_key_names(keys)` builds the tuple. If `newest_alert_check_id()` does not get exactly the same names as `collect_alerts()`, the alert's `source` differs, the acknowledgement stores `check_id = None`, `_is_acknowledged()` refuses to hide an alert without a check id, and the alert can never be closed. Keep the default `()` on `build_alerts()`. `_send_health_check_list()` passes the same tuple for its `needs_follow_up` field. - **Every closure of a check is shown, key-sourced or not.** `app.closed_alerts()` and `database._grouped_closures()` list every acknowledgement that carries a `check_id`, so a rotation, a replaced hardware, an updated contact, an ignored key alert, and a software alert closed by removing it are all shown. `GET /api/health-checks/` returns them as `closed_alerts`, and the CSV has one last column, `Follow-up closed`, with `code: action (YYYY-MM-DD)`, hanging on the check it closed through `check_id`. The history table shows `Alert`, `Action` and `Closed` only — the source is not a column. - **The key card shows the next due date with the alert note.** `createKeyCard()` in `static/app.js` always renders `Next check due` and adds the alert note on top. The note comes in addition to the date, never instead of it. - **The type is part of a key's identity.** The setup locks it, the settings never change it, and only a rotation may pick the other one: `POST /api/keys//rotate` takes an optional `type`, and leaving it out keeps the current type. Since schema 13 a rotation does **not** write the key row: it inserts a new row and retires the old one. - **A key that becomes a cloud key must not take a taken name.** A cloud key offers its own name as a wallet software choice, so a name the list already holds is refused with `409` through `WalletSoftwareNameInUse` — a `ValidationError` subclass, so it has to be caught before the general `ValidationError` in `_rotate_key`, or the `409` turns into a `400`. `validate_rotation()` therefore takes the wallet software list as a fourth argument. - **A rename needs no rotation and no confirmation.** In the rotation section the name can be changed on its own through `POST /api/settings/keys`, for any key, and the address path of a key with **no** saved check can be changed there the same way. The single button is `Save keys`. ### Deliberately left out `remove_software` is still a dead end in two places: a software-sourced `security_vulnerable` offers it next to `ignore` (so the alert stays closable, but one button leads nowhere), and a software-sourced `security_compromised` offers it as its only action, so an alert whose "software" is a cloud key name can never be closed. Neither is fixed. ## Rules that are easy to get wrong — do not re-open - **One submission records one key.** There is no "round" grouping, and each key's next check is its own date plus one calendar year, computed on the server and not editable in the form. - **A key that could not be checked records nothing else.** That covers `available` = `0` and a recorded address path that does not match. `wallet_software` and `ai_security_checks` must be empty; a non-empty value is a `400`, not something dropped silently. Nothing is stored for them, and `software_compatibility_status` becomes `NOT_ASSESSED`. - **`Availability` is required and offers only Yes/No.** A cloud key collects only `Availability`; its compatibility is derived from it, and its own name is the wallet software. - **A hardware key needs an explicit compatibility status**, and `Hardware works` needs an explicit `Yes` or `No`. A missing value, `""` and `NOT_ASSESSED` are all a `400`. - **The contact confirmation is required** for every submission, including one for a key that could not be checked, and it has no "not assessed" value. - **`NOT_ASSESSED` is not offered or accepted anywhere else.** - **`Address path verified` is never a form field again.** The server derives it from the comparison. - **The address path is locked after the first saved check**, and no two keys may share one — in the setup, in the settings or in a rotation. The comparison is canonical: `m/48h/0h/0h/2h` and `m/48'/0'/0'/2'` are the same path, and the stored spelling is never rewritten. - **The type is locked by the setup**, and only a rotation may change it. A rename alone is not a rotation. - **An alert is closed by the user, not by a newer check.** A newer check that raises nothing does not clear an older alert, and a key with an open alert cannot get a new check at all. - **An acknowledgement stores the action name, not a free reason.** `rotate` has its own endpoint, because it requires a new address path. - **Every alert message says what is wrong, which key or software, and what closes it**, and it does not repeat the name in `source` — except the cloud-key form of `software_incompatible`. See §7. - **The export is plain CSV only.** XLSX is not built and the app does not promise Excel compatibility. The column names and the column order are an agreement; do not change them. A text cell that a spreadsheet would read as a formula is neutralized with a leading apostrophe, and that is the only change a cell may receive. - **The PWA cache stores only a valid shell answer.** `isCacheable()` in `static/sw.js` requires `response.ok`, `response.type === "basic"` and `!response.redirected`. The allow-list is the other half: the worker never names `/api/*`, `/health`, `/login` or `/robots.txt`. - **No page is meant to be crawled.** All six pages carry `` in ``, `_send_security_headers()` in `app.py` adds `X-Robots-Tag: noindex, nofollow`, and `static/robots.txt` answers `Disallow: /`. `static/robots.txt` must **not** be added to the service worker's shell list. - **The navigation lives in the top bar, not on the page.** `static/session.js` builds the menu, the panel and the `.topbar-actions` wrapper on the five application pages; `/login` has none. The dashboard markup carries no `href` for `/health-check`, `/settings`, `/history` or `/api/export`, and the export link and its note are on the history page. The page the user is already on is a `` with `aria-current="page"`, not a link. - **The Attention card is the only summary card.** Its detail line carries the overdue list when something is overdue and the earliest due date otherwise; `.overview-grid` is one column at every width. - **An empty alert list renders nothing.** The count beside the heading says `No alerts`. - **The two summary fields are additive and mean what they say.** `key_names` follows `key_numbers` and carries the name the check was recorded with, read from the snapshot on the check; `needs_follow_up` is a property of the saved check, so it does not change when an alert is closed or a key is renamed. Do not "fix" it to follow `collect_alerts()`, which hides acknowledged alerts and would rewrite history. - **The prohibition lists** in sections 1 and 13 of `TODO.md` stay unticked. They are standing prohibitions, to be re-confirmed before release — with the one amendment for the installable PWA. - **Whether a date is overdue is decided in the browser**, so `/api/key-status` stays independent of the current date. - **`/api/previous-values` still returns a `security` map** that nothing consumes any more, and its `address_path` per key is no longer used by the form, which pre-fills the path from `keys.address_path`. Both are deliberate. - **`delete_all_data()` deletes the checks before the keys.** `key_checks.key_id` is `ON DELETE RESTRICT`, so the other order fails. The acknowledgements are deleted explicitly, because they have no foreign key at all. The delete has to clear every row of `keys`, active and retired alike. ## Data model (schema version 13) - `keys`: `key_number` (1–`multisig_key_count`), `name`, `type` (`hardware`/`cloud`), `model`, `address_path`, `active`, `rotated_at`, `created_at`. There is no `device` column. The name is editable in the settings; the type and the address path are the identity of the key, the path must be unique across the **active** rows, and the type only changes through a rotation. `model` is optional documentation and is not locked. - `health_checks`: `checked_at`, `next_check_due`, `wallet_software`, `software_version`, `software_compatibility_status`, `software_comments`, `contact_info_verified`, `comments`, plus the legacy `sparrow_version` / `nunchuk_version`. - `key_checks`: one row per submission — `key_id`, `key_name`, `key_type`, `key_model`, `available`, `hardware_works`, `firmware_version`, `seed_backup_verified`, `address_path_verified`, `address_path`, `comments`. The three snapshot columns are a frozen copy of the key the check was recorded for. - `ai_security_checks`: `provider` (free text), `key_id` (nullable), `status`, `comments`, with `UNIQUE (health_check_id, provider)`. - `wallet_software`: `name`, `created_at`. Seeded with `DEFAULT_WALLET_SOFTWARE` (`Sparrow Wallet`) when the list is empty, never emptied through the API. - `alert_acknowledgements`: `code`, `source`, `key_id`, `check_id`, `reason`, `acknowledged_at`. - `app_settings`: `name` (PRIMARY KEY), `value`. Holds `multisig_threshold`, `multisig_key_count`, `admin_username`, `admin_password_hash`, `session_secret`, `failed_login_count` and `failed_login_until`. - `tool_checks` no longer exists. - Startup migration rebuilds `keys` when it still has `device`, the old `key_number` CHECK, or no `active` flag; `key_checks` when it uses the old layout or still holds the two cloud columns; and `health_checks` when its `CHECK` constraints still allow the old values. It then drops `tool_checks` if it is there, adds the newer columns through `OPTIONAL_COLUMNS`, backfills the snapshot on every check from the key it belongs to, and creates the partial unique index over the active row. The `UNIQUE` on `keys.key_number` is now a partial unique index over the active row (`idx_keys_active_key_number … WHERE active = 1`). - The table definitions are `{table}` templates, so a rebuild can create the same table under a temporary name. `health_checks` is a parent table, so the whole migration runs with `PRAGMA foreign_keys = OFF`, checks `PRAGMA foreign_key_check` before committing, and rolls back on any failure. - `tests/test_database.py` carries `LEGACY_SCHEMA`, `SCHEMA_VERSION_5`, `SCHEMA_VERSION_8`, `SCHEMA_VERSION_9`, `SCHEMA_VERSION_10`, `SCHEMA_VERSION_11` and `SCHEMA_VERSION_12` as literal older schemas. Copy that pattern for a new migration test: write the old schema, run `initialize_database()`, then assert on the migrated rows. - There is **no data migration** for an older test database: the user deletes the `data` folder and configures the setup again. An acknowledgement written before version 11 has no key, and the older contact alert used the source `Contact information`, which no longer matches, so the alert it closed is raised again. ## API Pages: `/`, `/setup`, `/settings`, `/health-check`, `/history`, `/login`. Endpoints: `GET /health`, `GET /api/session`, `POST /api/admin`, `POST /api/login`, `POST /api/logout`, `GET /api/setup`, `POST /api/setup`, `GET /api/keys`, `GET /api/key-status`, `GET /api/previous-values`, `GET /api/settings`, `POST /api/settings/keys`, `POST /api/settings/wallet-software`, `POST /api/keys//rotate`, `GET /api/health-checks`, `GET /api/health-checks/`, `GET /api/alerts`, `POST /api/alerts/acknowledge`, `GET /api/export`, `POST /api/health-checks`. Field details are in `docs/application.md` — which is behind the code, see §32.6. Maintenance commands, run inside the container by the StartOS actions and usable by hand: `maintenance.py delete-all-data` and `maintenance.py set-admin-password`. Neither is an HTTP endpoint. Five things that are easy to break: - New static files must be added to `STATIC_FILES` in `app.py`, or they return `404`. That includes `/settings`, `/settings.js`, `/login`, `/login.js`, `/session.js`, `/sw.js`, `/manifest.webmanifest`, `/icon.svg`, the two raster icons `/icon-192.png` and `/icon-512.png`, and `/robots.txt`, which is `text/plain; charset=utf-8` and is deliberately absent from the service worker's shell list. - `/api/setup`, `/api/settings`, `/api/alerts`, `/api/key-status`, `/api/previous-values` and `/api/session` are extra endpoints that are not in the minimum list in section 11. - `STORAGE_ERRORS` in `app.py` includes `RuntimeError`, because `list_keys()` raises it for a partial setup. Keep it there, or a broken database answers with a traceback instead of a `500`. It also includes `ValueError`, so `validate_admin_credentials()` has to be called in its own `try` and mapped to a `400` before the storage handler — and it is why a refused secret has to be a `ValidationError` rather than a bare `ValueError`. - The settings, rotation and acknowledgement endpoints keep the same error handling as the existing ones: a bad payload is a `400`, an unknown key or alert is a `404`, a locked or duplicate address path is a `409`, and a broken database is a `500`. `DuplicateAddressPath` and `WalletSoftwareNameInUse` must be caught before the general `ValidationError` — in `_save_key_settings` and `_rotate_key` respectively — or the `409` turns into a `400`. A missing or invalid session is a `401`, a missing CSRF token is a `403`, and a locked login is a `429`. - `newest_alert_check_id()` in `app.py` derives the check id for the acknowledgement, the rotation and the software removal, so the same comparison rule is used in all three places. `blocking_alert()` is the module-level helper the `409` is built on, and `_blocking_alert()` reads the key id straight from the payload, so the rule applies before validation. The rotate payload is `replaced` + `keep_name` + `name` + `type` + `address_path`, and `type` is optional. A rotation inserts a new row and retires the old one, and the acknowledgements are written against the **old** key id. `GET /api/health-checks/` also returns `closed_alerts`, and each of its `key_checks` rows carries `model` as well. The `#history-detail` anchor and the `?id=` query on `/history` are client-side only: they never reach the server, so no route changed for them. ## The StartOS package — the parts that bite The package is one service: one daemon, one container, one SQLite database on the persistent `main` volume, mounted at `/data`. No Postgres, no Redis, no external backend, no extra container. - **The application and the package share one repository, at the root.** A deliberate deviation from the guide's "a package repo is not a fork of the application": the rule assumes a published upstream image or a git submodule, and VardKey has neither. `AGENTS.md` states the deviation so nobody adds an `upstream-project/` submodule to "fix" it. - **Anything the `Dockerfile` does not `COPY` is not in the image.** The modules go in with `COPY *.py ./` and the assets with `COPY static ./static`; `.dockerignore` keeps `tests`, `data`, `node_modules`, `javascript` and the build output out of the context. `static/` must be copied: `app.py` answers `/health` from code, but every page is read from `ROOT/static`, so an image without it reports a healthy service whose whole UI answers `404`. - **Three things must agree.** `startos/utils.ts` holds `uiPort` (8080); `startos/main.ts` passes it as `PORT` and uses it in the readiness URL; `startos/interfaces.ts` binds it. The readiness check is `checkWebUrl` against `http://127.0.0.1:8080/health`, and `/health` must stay open. A red `ECONNREFUSED 127.0.0.1:8080` blip before `VardKey listening on port 8080` is just the first poll landing before Python has bound the socket; nothing to fix. - **Two actions**, registered through `Actions.of()` in `startos/actions/index.ts`, with their strings in `startos/i18n/dictionaries/`: `deleteAllData.ts` (`delete-all-data`) and `setAdminPassword.ts` (`set-admin-password`). Both run `maintenance.py` in a `withTemp` subcontainer, behind a confirmation the handler enforces. The generated password never travels into the container: `maintenance.py` generates it there and prints it. - **The required task** from §32.8 point 1 lives in `startos/init/requireAdmin.ts` and keeps the same property: no password travels from the host into the container. It raises and clears the task itself, because SDK 3.0.4 has no condition for "the admin password is unset". The probe fails open. Its behaviour on the box is still open — see §32.8 point 7 above. - **Backups.** `startos/backups.ts` is `sdk.Backups.ofVolumes('main')`. StartOS stops the service for the duration of a backup, so the database file is quiescent while it is copied — no snapshot hook is needed. - **No CI.** The guide assumes GitHub Actions; this repository is on Gitea, so there are no `.github/workflows/` and there must not be any. The `.s9pk` is built locally with `make`. - **The skeleton** was written to match the Start9 template rather than generated by `s9pk init-workspace`, because that command was not available where it was written. The successful build and install confirm they are equivalent; `@start9labs/start-sdk` is pinned to `3.0.4`. `node_modules/` is not in the repository. - **The root `icon.svg` is the package artwork**, read from the repository root by the build. It is the same retro drawing as `static/icon.svg`, and it must stay under 40 KiB. - **Documentation layout.** `README.md` is the StartOS package README, with the guide's fixed heading set. The application's own reference is `docs/application.md`, which `instructions.md` links to. `AGENTS.md` is the repo-specific agent context, and `CLAUDE.md` is the one-line `@AGENTS.md` import. Both `README.md` and `docs/application.md` are behind the code — that is §32.6. ## Traps that already cost time — do not repeat - **`with sqlite3.connect(...)` does not close the connection.** It only commits or rolls back the transaction. On Windows the database file stays locked and `TemporaryDirectory.cleanup()` fails with `WinError 32`. Always close explicitly with `try`/`finally`; see `write_schema()` in `tests/test_database.py`. - **A module the image is missing is a runtime error, not a build error.** `auth.py` was once left out of the `Dockerfile`, and both `app.py` and `maintenance.py` then died with `ModuleNotFoundError` inside the container while every test stayed green. The `COPY *.py ./` line is what stops that recurring. `secret_guard.py` is covered by the same line. - **Every server test module needs a session, and a redirect makes a missing one look like a pass.** A page fetched without a session answers `302 → /login`, and `urllib` follows it, so an assertion on page markup reads the login page's HTML instead of failing with `401`. Use `tests/server_session.py`'s `SessionMixin`. The manifest, the icons and `/robots.txt` are open while the pages are not. - **`urlopen` raises `HTTPError` on a 4xx.** A test that expects a `400` has to catch it and read the body from the exception; `tests/test_secret_guard.py`'s `post_status()` helper is the pattern. A `429` is read the same way. - **A field has a length limit, and the guard runs before it.** Use a WIF key (52 characters) or a BIP38 key (58) when a test needs a secret that *fits* a short field, and the seed phrase where the field has room. - **A `required` control inside a `display:none` container still blocks submission.** Hiding a section is not enough: the required flags must be cleared. That is why `renderSecurityChecks()` shows an empty note instead of cards when a key could not be checked, why `syncUncheckableState()` clears the flags on the wallet software and the compatibility select, and why `syncRequiredFields()` clears the flag on `hardware_works` and `seed_backup_verified`. The rotation fields follow the same rule: the type is `disabled` until the key is marked for rotation, the path is `disabled` when the key has a saved check and is not marked, and the script refuses to send an empty path. The login page sidesteps it with two separate forms. - **A hidden element has no box, so an anchor cannot jump to it.** `#history-detail` is hidden until a check is opened, so `revealDetail()` in `history.js` unhides the section first and only then calls `scrollIntoView()`. Do not reorder those two lines. - **A bare substring assertion over page markup also catches comments.** Assert on the element, not on the phrase. - **A `display: grid` panel ignores the `hidden` attribute.** `.menu-panel[hidden] { display: none; }` is in the sheet for that reason, the same way `.form-stack[hidden]`, `.field-grid[hidden]` and `.form-section[hidden]` already were. - **The menu's outside-click listener has to allow the button's own click.** The button's handler runs first and toggles the panel; the document listener then sees a target inside `.menu` and does nothing. - **The current-page check compares a normalised path, and the current item is a span.** `currentPath()` strips trailing slashes and keeps the root as `/`. The match is rendered as a `` with `aria-current="page"`, never an ``. - **A sticky top bar needs a scroll container that is the viewport.** `.topbar` is a flex child of `body`, and `body` sets no `overflow`, so `position: sticky; top: 0` works — but it stops working the moment an ancestor gets `overflow: hidden` or `auto`. The menu panel is `position: absolute` inside the bar, so it travels with it. - **The mismatch confirmation follows its warning.** `#address-path-confirmed` is `required` only while `#address-path-warning` is visible, so the browser itself stops the submission. - **The per-field secret reminder is gone; only the setup keeps one.** A test asserts `setup.html` holds exactly one `class="secret-warning"` and that the check form and the settings hold none. - **`static/health-check.js` must not use `placeholder` anywhere.** A test asserts the string is absent, because a previous value is a real input value. - **The key card's line order is pinned by two test modules.** `tests/test_key_status.py` asserts `card.append(top, name)` → `card.append(model)` → `card.append(path)`, and `tests/test_health_check_form.py` asserts the top line, that `card.append(type)` is gone, and that the model line is skipped by `sameLabel(entry.model, entry.name)`. - **The dashboard heading is dynamic and the static description is gone.** `tests/test_app.py` asserts `id="setup-shape"` and the fallback text on the dashboard, while `tests/test_pwa.py` still asserts the manifest description. Do not move the one into the other. - **The stylesheet test asserts on the shape of the theme, not on its wording.** It checks the two bevel colour pairs, the dotted focus outline, the font stack, the absence of `box-shadow` and `gradient`, and that every `border-radius` in the sheet is `0`. - **The brand mark is an image, and the class name is pinned.** `IconTests` in `tests/test_pwa.py` asserts that all six pages carry ``, that the sheet holds `image-rendering: pixelated`, and that `place-items: center` appears nowhere. It also pins `min-height: 100vh`, `min-height: 100dvh`, `flex-direction: column` and the exact string `main { flex: 1 1 auto; }`. Do not style the brand mark as a letter again. - **The two SVG files must keep the same drawing.** The package icon at the repository root is the source of truth, and `test_the_served_icon_carries_the_same_drawing_as_the_package_icon` compares them from `` onwards. A change to one drawing has to be made in both. - **The two PNGs are real files, rasterized by the user**, because the agent has no rasterizer. `IconTests` reads each file's IHDR and asserts 192×192 and 512×512. - **The manifest lists the SVG first, and the two PNGs after it.** `test_the_manifest_lists_the_served_icon` reads `icons[0]`. The PNG entries must carry the real size (`192x192` and `512x512`) and `type: "image/png"`. - **The favicon link sits next to the manifest link, and `/login` has no manifest.** `IconTests` asserts the exact string `

` that carries the same `id`. - **Do not assert on the quoting style of the JavaScript.** `static/health-check.js` uses single quotes for constant selectors and template literals where a `${...}` substitution is needed, and `static/settings.js` uses double quotes. Assert on the selector text and on quote-free substrings. - **`clean_record()` in `tests/test_alerts.py` has a fixed provider list and carries the key on the security rows.** Each `ai_security_checks` entry is a dict with `provider`, `key_id` and `status`: the entry whose provider is the key's own name carries the key number, and the others carry `None`. The alert texts are asserted there, and **not** in `tests/test_app.py`, which checks the code, the severity, the source, the actions and the `key_id` only. - **`sample_payload()` / `unavailable_payload()` are duplicated in `tests/test_validation.py`, `tests/test_database.py`, `tests/test_app.py`, `tests/test_maintenance.py` and `tests/test_secret_guard.py`.** They must send the key's **own** `address_path`, because the server compares it with the stored one. - **Every test fixture uses one address path per key** (`ADDRESS_PATH`, `SECOND_ADDRESS_PATH`, `THIRD_ADDRESS_PATH`). `tests/test_app.py` also has `ROTATION_PATHS` and the `rotate()` helper. With schema 13 a rotation retires the key row, so a test that rotates and then records a check has to use the **new** key id — `rotate()` hands it back under `key_id`. - **`validate_health_check()` takes a third argument** (the wallet software list), and `validate_rotation()` takes a fourth for the same reason. - **`tests/test_app.py` has seven test classes.** A new test must go in the class whose setup it needs: `ServerTestCase`, `AppHandlerTests`, `RenamedSetupTests`, `SettingsApiTests`, `RotationApiTests`, `AcknowledgementApiTests`, `AuthApiTests` and `KeySetupApiTests`. Every request helper sends the cookies and the CSRF header, and `assert_status()` is the one place an error status is expected. - **The other server test modules share `tests/server_session.py`.** `test_export_filename.py`, `test_key_model.py`, `test_key_status.py`, `test_multisig_setup.py`, `test_pwa.py` and `test_secret_guard.py` mix in `SessionMixin`, which signs in through the API; each class calls `authenticate()` at the end of its own `setUp`. **A test that switches `DATABASE_PATH` to another file has to call `authenticate()` again**, because the session secret lives in the database. - **A login lockout test has to clear the counter.** `AuthApiTests` shares one database per test, and the lockout lives in `app_settings`, so a test that trips it leaves the account locked for the tests that follow unless it resets the two rows or uses its own database file. - **The export link and its note live on the history page, and four tests moved with them.** `tests/test_export_filename.py` asserts the dashboard has no `/api/export` link; `tests/test_app.py`'s `test_the_dashboard_carries_no_navigation_link_of_its_own`; `test_the_history_page_offers_the_export_in_its_own_section` in `tests/test_health_check_form.py` pins the `Export` section, the title bar, the note under the button and the absent `.page-heading > .secondary-button` rule; and `test_the_history_links_to_the_detail_section` pins both anchors. - **`#key-count` still exists in `setup.html`, but not on the dashboard.** The two are on different pages and were never the same element, so assert per file. - **Section 19 records one key per submission**, so a `Check id` in the export can cover up to three keys only for rows saved before section 19. - **The database path default is repeated in sixteen places.** `database.py` carries `database_path="data/vardkey.sqlite3"` as the default of every storage function (fifteen of them), and `app.py` carries it in `get_database_path()`. A missed one makes a single code path read or create the other file, silently. ## Tooling — what the agent can and cannot do - The Gitea tools write a **whole file** at a time (`gitea_update_file`, auto-SHA, one file per call), and there is no preview step and no shell. There is no branch delete either. - The agent therefore **cannot** run the suite, `make x86`, `tsc --noEmit` or `prettier --check`. The user runs them, and the user is the one who rasterizes an image or deletes a branch by hand. - Keep the documents short. `TODO.md` and this note are read by every future model, and their size is context the next round cannot spend. ## Product clarification The key's configured name is its product label, and a cloud key's name is also a wallet-software choice. A hardware key name is never a wallet-software choice, and a cloud key records its own name as its software. A key is identified by its type and its address path, while the name is only a label that the user may change. The address path is unique per key, and a rotation replaces the key with a new one that must carry a new address path and may carry the other type. A rotation creates a new wallet, so the funds have to be moved from the old multisig setup to the new one before the old keys are discarded. An alert is closed by the user with the action that belongs to it, and a key with an open alert cannot be checked until the alert is closed. **Since §32.8 point 5, a rotation also retires the old key row**: the multisig slot number stays, the old checks keep the name and type they were recorded with, and the new row starts with an empty history.