document the unauthenticated endpoints, drop TODO.md for issues

Nothing on the proxy is authenticated, so whoever can reach the port can
spend the user's PPQ.AI balance — true of every version, and not
something either doc said. Enabling PPQ_DATA_DIR adds a second
unauthenticated route, POST /setup/api-key, which replaces the stored
key (upstream PayPerQ/ppq-private-mode-proxy#23).

README states both and whose each is; instructions.md tells the user
plainly to expose the interface only to people they trust, which is the
part they can act on.

TODO.md is deleted rather than emptied. Its live-inference item is
closed — PayPerQ confirmed billed end-to-end against glm-5-2 and
llama3-3-70b — and the other two are now issues #2 (backup/restore,
unverified: it needs the server password, and the 0.4 file split gives
it two new ways to fail) and #3 (bump when the auth patch lands, and
retract the warnings it makes false). The scaffold's worklist has been
worked; a file left behind to say so is not worth reading.
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helix-nine committed 2026-08-12 10:06:57 -06:00
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# TODO — remaining work before release
- [ ] Run one live inference request with a funded PPQ.AI key. Everything up to
the enclave is verified (attestation, encrypted forward, error handling),
but no request has yet been billed end-to-end against a real key.
- [ ] Re-run backup and restore on a StartOS box: back up, uninstall, restore,
and confirm the service comes back with its key and raises no
configuration task.