document the unauthenticated endpoints, drop TODO.md for issues

Nothing on the proxy is authenticated, so whoever can reach the port can
spend the user's PPQ.AI balance — true of every version, and not
something either doc said. Enabling PPQ_DATA_DIR adds a second
unauthenticated route, POST /setup/api-key, which replaces the stored
key (upstream PayPerQ/ppq-private-mode-proxy#23).

README states both and whose each is; instructions.md tells the user
plainly to expose the interface only to people they trust, which is the
part they can act on.

TODO.md is deleted rather than emptied. Its live-inference item is
closed — PayPerQ confirmed billed end-to-end against glm-5-2 and
llama3-3-70b — and the other two are now issues #2 (backup/restore,
unverified: it needs the server password, and the 0.4 file split gives
it two new ways to fail) and #3 (bump when the auth patch lands, and
retract the warnings it makes false). The scaffold's worklist has been
worked; a file left behind to say so is not worth reading.
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helix-nine committed 2026-08-12 10:06:57 -06:00
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@@ -74,5 +74,12 @@ you already saved.
## Limitations
**The proxy has no login of its own, so only expose it to people you trust.**
Anyone who can reach the address can send requests that are billed to your
PPQ.AI key, and can replace the stored key from the Status Page. On a LAN-only
address that means everyone on your network; if you enable a Tor or public
address, it means anyone with the address. Keeping it on the LAN, or on Tor with
the address kept private, is the safe default.
Backups of this service include your saved API key, and restoring a backup
restores it — keep that in mind when handling backup drives.