document the unauthenticated endpoints, drop TODO.md for issues
Nothing on the proxy is authenticated, so whoever can reach the port can spend the user's PPQ.AI balance — true of every version, and not something either doc said. Enabling PPQ_DATA_DIR adds a second unauthenticated route, POST /setup/api-key, which replaces the stored key (upstream PayPerQ/ppq-private-mode-proxy#23). README states both and whose each is; instructions.md tells the user plainly to expose the interface only to people they trust, which is the part they can act on. TODO.md is deleted rather than emptied. Its live-inference item is closed — PayPerQ confirmed billed end-to-end against glm-5-2 and llama3-3-70b — and the other two are now issues #2 (backup/restore, unverified: it needs the server password, and the 0.4 file split gives it two new ways to fail) and #3 (bump when the auth patch lands, and retract the warnings it makes false). The scaffold's worklist has been worked; a file left behind to say so is not worth reading.
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@@ -107,6 +107,16 @@ Two interfaces on one HTTP host, port 8787, both served by the proxy:
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Availability on LAN/Tor is decided by the user from the interface panel.
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**No endpoint is authenticated.** Upstream ships no auth on any route, so
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whoever can reach the port can spend the user's PPQ.AI balance via
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`/v1/chat/completions`, and — because this package sets `PPQ_DATA_DIR` — can
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also replace the stored key via `POST /setup/api-key`
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([upstream #23](https://github.com/PayPerQ/ppq-private-mode-proxy/issues/23)).
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The billing exposure predates that endpoint and is inherent to the proxy; the
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key-replacement one is enabled by our `PPQ_DATA_DIR` choice, and closes when
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upstream's patch lands and this package bumps to it. `instructions.md` warns
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the user to expose the interface accordingly.
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## Actions (StartOS UI)
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- **Configure PPQ API Key** (`configure-api-key`) — visible and enabled at any
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@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
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# TODO — remaining work before release
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- [ ] Run one live inference request with a funded PPQ.AI key. Everything up to
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the enclave is verified (attestation, encrypted forward, error handling),
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but no request has yet been billed end-to-end against a real key.
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- [ ] Re-run backup and restore on a StartOS box: back up, uninstall, restore,
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and confirm the service comes back with its key and raises no
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configuration task.
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@@ -74,5 +74,12 @@ you already saved.
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## Limitations
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**The proxy has no login of its own, so only expose it to people you trust.**
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Anyone who can reach the address can send requests that are billed to your
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PPQ.AI key, and can replace the stored key from the Status Page. On a LAN-only
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address that means everyone on your network; if you enable a Tor or public
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address, it means anyone with the address. Keeping it on the LAN, or on Tor with
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the address kept private, is the safe default.
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Backups of this service include your saved API key, and restoring a backup
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restores it — keep that in mind when handling backup drives.
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