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# VardKey application reference
This is the VardKey application's own documentation: what it does, its HTTP API, and the rules it
enforces. It moved here from `README.md` when that file became the StartOS package README. The
packaging side — container runtime, volumes, interfaces, backups — is documented in `README.md`;
the user-facing quick start is `instructions.md`.
VardKey is a local web application for recording annual checks of a fixed 2-of-3 multisig setup — a Bitcoin multisig health monitor. It does not sign transactions, perform wallet operations, or store seed phrases, private keys, passwords, or other wallet secrets.
## Current status
The English dashboard shows the three key profiles, the latest saved check dates, and every active follow-up alert. Each key card shows its own last check date and next due date, and the summary cards above the alerts show the earliest upcoming date and any key that has passed its due date. A key that has an open alert shows a clear message that it needs action and how many alerts are open, in addition to its dates, which stay visible. The annual health-check form records the checklist for **one selected key per submission** and saves it to a local SQLite database, and `/history` lists saved checks with a read-only detail view that also shows the follow-up that was closed on the check. `GET /api/export` returns every saved check as a CSV download, with the follow-up that was closed in the last column. `/settings` holds the wallet software list and the keys, where a name can be changed on its own and a key can be rotated into the other type. The StartOS package is implemented alongside the application; the manual StartOS test is still open. The application does not claim that any device or backup has been tested.
The form is in six sections, in this order: 01 Schedule, 02 Key, 03 Compatibility, 04 External research, 05 Contact confirmation, 06 Notes.
The key setup is configured once, on a new database, at `/setup`: the user gives each of the three key slots a name, a type (`hardware` or `cloud`), and an **address path**. The name is a label that the settings can change later. The type and the address path are locked once the setup is saved, and together they are the identity of the key. **No two keys may share an address path.**
Each key has its own next-check date, calculated on the server as one calendar year after the check date (29 February is clamped to 28 February). The date is not editable in the form, and a submission for one key never changes another key's interval.
**A key with an open alert cannot be checked.** The form marks the blocked keys, names the alert that stands in the way, the action that closes it, and the keys that are still free, and it links to the dashboard. The server enforces the same rule, so a direct API call cannot bypass it, and the key becomes available again as soon as its alert is closed. The blocking applies to that key only, and it also covers the informational contact alert, which belongs to its key like every other key alert.
`Availability` is the first question in the form and is required. When a key is not available, the rest of the check cannot be recorded, so the form hides the software compatibility and the security statuses and submits only the availability, the key note, the contact confirmation, and the overall comment. That single submission is a complete result and raises the follow-up alert.
`Hardware works` and the contact confirmation are required choices. Both start on `Select status`, which is not an answer, and a submission that leaves either of them out is rejected with `400`.
Firmware version, address path, and software version are pre-filled with the last saved value for the selected key and the selected wallet software. The value is a real input value, not a placeholder, so a field the user leaves untouched is saved as it stands. A field with no relevant saved value stays empty.
## Run locally
Requires Python 3.9 or later. No third-party packages are needed.
```sh
python3 app.py
```
Open <http://localhost:8080>. Set the `PORT` environment variable to use a different port. Set `DATABASE_PATH` to change the SQLite database file location; it defaults to `data/vardkey.sqlite3`.
Run the tests with:
```sh
python3 -m unittest discover -s tests
```
## HTTP API
| Method | Path | Purpose |
| --- | --- | --- |
| GET | `/health` | Returns `{"status":"ok"}` for service health checks. |
| GET | `/api/setup` | Returns whether the key setup is stored, with the stored keys. |
| POST | `/api/setup` | Stores the key setup once, for the three key slots. |
| GET | `/api/keys` | Returns the three configured key profiles, or `[]` on a new database. |
| GET | `/api/key-status` | Returns each key with the dates of its newest saved check. |
| GET | `/api/settings` | Returns the keys with their address paths and the wallet software list. |
| POST | `/api/settings/keys` | Stores the name of one key, and its address path while it is unlocked. |
| POST | `/api/settings/wallet-software` | Stores the whole wallet software list, and closes the alerts of a removed name. |
| POST | `/api/keys/<id>/rotate` | Rotates one key with a new address path and closes the alerts it raised. |
| GET | `/api/health-checks` | Returns saved check summaries, newest first, including the checked key numbers. |
| GET | `/api/health-checks/<id>` | Returns one saved check with its related rows and the closures it has. |
| GET | `/api/alerts` | Returns the merged follow-up alerts of every saved check. |
| POST | `/api/alerts/acknowledge` | Closes one alert with the action that belongs to it. |
| GET | `/api/export` | Returns every saved key check as a CSV download. |
| POST | `/api/health-checks` | Validates and stores one check for one selected key. |
## Key setup
`POST /api/setup` accepts exactly three keys, one per slot, and writes them once:
```json
{"keys": [
{"key_number": 1, "name": "ColdCard", "type": "hardware", "address_path": "m/48'/0'/0'/2'"},
{"key_number": 2, "name": "Blockstream Jade", "type": "hardware", "address_path": "m/48'/1'/0'/2'"},
{"key_number": 3, "name": "Nunchuk", "type": "cloud", "address_path": "m/48'/2'/0'/2'"}
]}
```
A name that is empty, a name that repeats another name (compared without regard to case), a type other than `hardware` or `cloud`, an address path that is empty or longer than 200 characters, a missing key number, or a key number outside 1–3 is rejected with `400`.
**Every key needs its own address path.** A path that another key already has is rejected with `400`, and the message names the key that has it. The comparison ignores surrounding whitespace and letter case, so two paths that differ only in case count as the same one. A database that already holds a setup is answered with `409`, because the type and the address path are locked. A database that holds only part of a setup is answered with `500` and is never treated as a new installation.
`GET /api/setup` returns `{"configured": false, "keys": []}` on a new database, and `{"configured": true, "keys": [...]}` once the setup is stored.
`GET /api/key-status` returns one entry per key with `key_id`, `key_number`, `name`, `type`, `last_checked_at`, and `next_check_due`. A key that has never been checked has `null` dates. Whether a date is overdue is decided by the client from `next_check_due`, so the endpoint stays independent of the current date.
## Settings
`GET /api/settings` returns the keys with the settings that may change, together with the wallet software list:
```json
{"keys": [
{"id": 1, "key_number": 1, "name": "ColdCard", "type": "hardware",
"address_path": "m/48'/0'/0'/2'", "has_checks": false}
], "wallet_software": ["Sparrow Wallet"]}
```
`has_checks` tells the page whether the address path of a key is still editable.
The settings page has two sections, `01 / Wallet software` and `02 / Key rotation`, and each saves on its own. The keys themselves are changed in the rotation section: the name of a key can be changed there on its own, the address path of a key that has no saved check can be changed with it, and the type and a new path are recorded together with a rotation.
`POST /api/settings/keys` stores one key at a time:
```json
{"key_id": 1, "name": "ColdCard", "address_path": "m/48'/0'/0'/2'"}
```
The name is only a label and may be changed at any time; it must be non-empty, at most 60 characters, and must not repeat another key's name. The type is never part of the payload: it is part of the identity of the key, and only a rotation changes it (section 28). The address path is part of the identity too, so it may only be changed while the key has **no saved check**: sending the stored path again is accepted, while a different path for a key that already has a check is answered with `409`. A path that another key already has is also answered with `409`, and the message names the key that has it. The answer is the same payload as `GET /api/settings`. An unknown key, an empty name, or a missing address path is a `400`.
`POST /api/settings/wallet-software` stores the whole list, not one entry at a time:
```json
{"wallet_software": ["Sparrow Wallet", "BlueWallet"]}
```
The list must hold at least one name, every name must be non-empty and at most 60 characters, no name may repeat another one (compared without regard to case), and a name that a configured cloud key already provides is refused, because that key offers its own name as a choice. A new database starts with `Sparrow Wallet` as its only entry, so a hardware key has a choice from the first check on. The entry may be replaced once another name has been added, but the list may never be emptied.
Removing a name never changes a saved check, because `health_checks` keeps the selected software as free text. **Removing a name does close the alerts that software raised**, which is how a software-sourced `software_incompatible` or `security_vulnerable` alert is closed. The answer therefore names the alerts that were closed:
```json
{"wallet_software": ["Sparrow Wallet"], "acknowledged": [{"code": "software_incompatible", "source": "BlueWallet"}]}
```
A cloud key name can never be removed this way, because the validation refuses it. When the recorded software of a check is a cloud key name, the alert belongs to the checked key instead and is closed by replacing the hardware, so the removal is not offered for it.
## Key rotation
`POST /api/keys/<id>/rotate` records that a key has been replaced by a new one:
```json
{"replaced": true, "keep_name": true, "name": "", "type": "cloud", "address_path": "m/48'/7'/0'/2'"}
```
`replaced` must be `true`, and `keep_name` must be `true` or `false`. When the name changes, `name` must be non-empty and must not repeat another key's name.
**The address path must change.** The rotation replaces the key, so the key is a new one and the path is part of its identity: the new path is required, the stored path is refused, and a path that another key already has is refused, all with `400`. An empty value is a `400` as well. The comparison ignores surrounding whitespace and letter case.
**The type may change here, and nowhere else.** The type is part of the identity of the key, so the setup locks it, and a rotation is what replaces the key with a new one (section 28). `type` is `hardware` or `cloud`, and leaving it out keeps the type the key has now. A key that ends up as a cloud key offers its own name as a wallet software choice, so a name the wallet software list already holds is refused with `409`, and the message names the entry that has to be removed first.
The rotation updates the key row and acknowledges the alerts that this key's own checks raised and that a replacement resolves. The acknowledgement stores the key it belongs to, so a rotation that changes the name still keeps the closed alerts closed. It changes no earlier check: the history shows the name the key has now, while the recorded results stay as they were.
The answer is the settings payload plus the acknowledged alerts:
```json
{"settings": {"keys": [], "wallet_software": []}, "acknowledged": [{"code": "key_unavailable", "source": "Key 2: Blockstream Jade"}]}
```
A rotation of an unknown key is a `404`, and a payload without the confirmation or without a new path is a `400`.
**Rotating a key creates a new wallet.** The funds have to be moved from the old multisig setup to the new one, and the new setup has to be verified, before it is relied on. The old keys and the old seed backups must not be discarded until the funds have been moved and confirmed. The settings page states this before the rotation can be confirmed, and it states why the path has to change.
## Health check
`POST /api/health-checks` accepts JSON and records exactly one configured key:
- **A key with an open alert is refused with `409`.** The key cannot get a new check until the alert is closed, and the rule is enforced on the server, so a direct API call cannot bypass it. The blocking applies to that key only, it covers the informational contact alert as well, and the answer names the alert that stands in the way. The check runs before the rest of the validation, so a blocked key always answers `409`.
- `key_check` is one object with the selected `key_id` and `available`. `available` is required and is `1` (yes) or `0` (no).
- `address_path` is the path the user read from the key. The server compares it with the path stored for that key, after stripping both, and records the result in `address_path_verified`: equal gives `OK`, different gives `PROBLEM`. The client never sends the verification result, and a submitted one is ignored.
- A recorded path that does not match makes the key **uncheckable**, which is treated exactly like a key that was not available: `address_path`, the key note, the contact confirmation, and the overall comment are stored, while the hardware, the software, and the security results stay empty, `wallet_software` becomes `NULL`, and `software_compatibility_status` becomes `NOT_ASSESSED`. Sending software or security results with a mismatched path is a `400`, not something dropped silently. The check raises the critical `address_path_mismatch` alert. A key that was not available records no path at all, so no mismatch is reported for it.
- When `available` is `1` and the path matches, the fields below are recorded as described.
- When `available` is `0`, the key could not be checked, so `wallet_software` and `ai_security_checks` must be absent or empty. Sending them is a `400` rather than something dropped silently. `software_compatibility_status` may be omitted and is then stored as `NOT_ASSESSED`. No security rows are stored, and `wallet_software` stays `NULL`.
- The remaining key fields are not required when the key was not available, and are stored as empty. The key note is kept.
- `hardware_works` (hardware keys only) requires an active `1` (yes) or `0` (no) when the key was available. A missing value is a `400`.
- `wallet_software` is one of the configured wallet software names: the settings list plus the name of every configured cloud key. A cloud key records its own name, because the provider is the software for that key. A hardware key name is never a software choice.
- `ai_security_checks` must cover the selected key by its configured name plus the selected wallet software, without duplicates: at most two rows, and one row when the key name and the software name are the same. `status` accepts `SECURE`, `PATCHED`, `VULNERABLE`, or `COMPROMISED`.
- `seed_backup_verified` (hardware keys only) accepts `OK` or `PROBLEM` and is required when the key was available and could be checked.
- `software_version` is recorded for every key, including a cloud key.
- `software_compatibility_status` requires an active choice when the key was available: `OK` or `PROBLEM`. A missing value, or `NOT_ASSESSED`, is a `400`. `NOT_ASSESSED` is only ever the derived `software_compatibility_status` of a key that could not be checked; no other field offers or accepts it. A cloud key always derives its compatibility from availability.
- `contact_info_verified` is required and is `Confirmed current` or `Needs external update`, also for a key that was not available. Only the status is stored, never names, addresses, phone numbers, or credentials. `Needs external update` shows a reminder in the form to update the records externally.
- `next_check_due` is ignored; the server derives it from `checked_at`.
A minimal submission for a key that was not available is therefore the check date, the key check, and the contact confirmation:
```json
{"checked_at": "2026-10-01", "contact_info_verified": "Confirmed current", "key_check": {"key_id": 2, "available": 0, "comments": "Key is with the third holder"}}
```
A minimal submission for a key whose address path does not match is the check date, the key check with the recorded path, and the contact confirmation:
```json
{"checked_at": "2026-10-01", "contact_info_verified": "Confirmed current", "key_check": {"key_id": 1, "available": 1, "address_path": "m/48'/9'/0'/2'", "comments": "Path read from the device"}}
```
Unknown statuses, unknown key ids, a missing `available`, a missing `hardware_works`, a missing contact confirmation, irrelevant or duplicated providers, security results for a key that could not be checked, invalid dates, and over-long text are rejected with `400`.
## CSV export
`GET /api/export` sends `vardkey-export.csv` as a download: UTF-8, comma separated, CRLF line endings, with a header row. It contains every saved key check, oldest first.
One row is one key check. The `Check id` column identifies the submission a row belongs to, so records saved before section 19 (up to three keys in one submission) stay grouped. The `Security status` column has more than one value per submission, so those values are joined into a single cell as `Label: value; Label: value`.
The last column, `Follow-up closed`, lists the follow-up that was closed on that check, as `code: action (YYYY-MM-DD)` in one cell, joined the same way. Only a closure that belongs to a key is listed, so a rotation, a replaced hardware, an updated contact, and an ignored key alert are shown, while a software alert that was removed or ignored is left out.
Stored `0`/`1` values are written as `No`/`Yes`, matching the history view. That covers `Available` and `Hardware works`. Status values are written exactly as stored, including the contact confirmation, which is `Confirmed current` or `Needs external update`. The `Address path verified` column holds the result the server derived from the comparison. The two derived cloud columns are gone, because a cloud key records only its availability. Empty values are written as empty cells, so a check that recorded only an unavailable key leaves the software and security columns empty. Text that contains a comma, a quote, or a semicolon is quoted and escaped by the standard CSV rules, so the file can be opened directly in a spreadsheet.
## Alerts
`GET /api/alerts` returns `[]` when no check has been saved, and otherwise the follow-up alerts of **every** saved check:
```json
{"code": "software_incompatible", "severity": "critical", "source": "Sparrow Wallet", "message": "This wallet software no longer supports the hardware. Add another wallet software in the settings, then remove this one to close the alert.", "actions": ["remove_software"], "software": "Sparrow Wallet", "key_id": null, "check_id": 12, "checked_at": "2026-10-01"}
```
`check_id` and `checked_at` name the saved check an alert came from, so the dashboard can show where a warning originated. `actions` names the actions that close the alert, `key_id` names the key when the alert belongs to a key, and `software` names the wallet software the alert is about, so the settings link and the removal point at the right entry. Identical alerts (same `code` and `source`) are merged, and only the newest one is listed, with its own date. Critical alerts come first, then the newest check first inside each severity.
An alert is therefore not cleared by a newer check that raises nothing: it stays visible until the user closes it with the action that belongs to it, and a closed alert comes back when a newer check raises the same code and source again. An alert that belongs to a key is identified by its key instead, so renaming a key does not reopen a closed alert. **A key with an open alert cannot get a new check at all** until the alert is closed.
A key alert names the key by its number and its configured name, so an alert always matches the key it came from. The name in the alert is the name the key has now, which the settings may change.
The alerts and the actions that close them:
| `code` | Severity | Source | Raised by | Actions |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| `key_unavailable` | critical | key | `available` = No | `rotate` |
| `address_path_mismatch` | critical | key | `address_path_verified` = `PROBLEM` | `rotate` |
| `hardware_failure` | critical | key | `Hardware works` = No | `rotate`, `replace_hardware` |
| `seed_backup_problem` | critical | key | Seed backup `PROBLEM` | `rotate` |
| `software_incompatible` | critical | key | `software_compatibility_status` = `PROBLEM`, and the recorded software is a configured cloud key name | `replace_hardware` |
| `software_incompatible` | critical | software | `software_compatibility_status` = `PROBLEM` | `remove_software` |
| `security_vulnerable` | critical | key | Security status `VULNERABLE` | `rotate`, `ignore` |
| `security_vulnerable` | critical | software | Security status `VULNERABLE` | `remove_software`, `ignore` |
| `security_compromised` | critical | key | Security status `COMPROMISED` | `rotate` |
| `security_compromised` | critical | software | Security status `COMPROMISED` | `remove_software` |
| `contact_info_unconfirmed` | info | key | Contact confirmation `Needs external update` | `contact_updated` |
The source of a security alert is the provider. When that provider is the key's own configured name, the key is the source and a rotation closes the alert; otherwise the provider is the software the key runs with, so the alert names it and is closed by removing it from the settings.
`software_incompatible` has two forms. When the recorded software is a name from the settings list, the software is the source, the alert names it, and it is closed by removing that entry. When the recorded software is the name of a configured cloud key, that name can never be removed from the settings, so the alert belongs to the checked key, names it, and is closed by replacing the hardware instead.
The contact alert belongs to the checked key and names it, so it blocks that key until the user has closed it, even though its severity is `info`.
`rotate` is performed in the settings, because a rotation requires a new address path, and the alert links there. The other actions are carried out where the alert is shown, and each of them has its own button text and its own confirmation step:
- `replace_hardware` records that a new hardware wallet has been set up with the same seed, so the key and the address path stay the same. The confirmation reads: *I have replaced the hardware wallet and restored the same seed on the new device.*
- `remove_software` removes the failing wallet software from the settings list, which is what closes the alert. When the failing name is the only entry, the user has to add a replacement first, because the list may never be empty, and the alert offers a link to the settings instead.
- `ignore` closes an alert without a replacement. It is never offered for `security_compromised`.
- `contact_updated` closes the contact alert, after the details have been updated externally. The confirmation reads: *I have updated the contact details in my external documentation.*
Every alert carries at least one action, so a key is never locked without a way out. An alert without an action is a bug in the code, not a state the user can reach.
A value that has not been assessed (`NOT_ASSESSED` or empty) never raises an alert, so "not assessed" is never confused with a negative result. An unavailable key raises one critical alert only, because the remaining checks for the key could not be performed. The old cloud health rule and the old address verification rule are gone: the two cloud fields they read no longer exist, and the mismatch has its own code.
The application only reports these alerts. It never performs the follow-up actions itself, and it never contacts providers or AI services.
### Closing an alert
`POST /api/alerts/acknowledge` closes one alert, identified by its code and its source, with the action that belongs to it:
```json
{"code": "hardware_failure", "source": "Key 1: ColdCard", "action": "replace_hardware"}
```
The action is stored as the reason, so the saved record says which action closed the alert. Only the actions the endpoint itself performs are accepted: `replace_hardware`, `remove_software`, `ignore`, and `contact_updated`. `rotate` is not one of them, because a rotation goes through `POST /api/keys/<id>/rotate` and requires a new address path; the removed generic acknowledgement is gone as well. An action that the alert does not offer is a `400`, an unknown code or action is a `400`, and a pair that is not among the current alerts is a `404`. A stored acknowledgement answers `201` and names the action:
```json
{"acknowledged": true, "code": "hardware_failure", "source": "Key 1: ColdCard", "action": "replace_hardware"}
```
The acknowledgement stores the newest check that raised the alert at that moment, so the alert stays hidden until a **newer check** for the same code and source raises it again; a newer check always has a higher id, so it reappears whatever date it carries. It also stores the key the alert belonged to, and an alert that belongs to a key is hidden by its key, so a rename does not open a closed alert again. Every action that closes an alert requires a confirmation from the user, and the app never performs the action itself.
The history detail view and the CSV export list the closures that belong to a key, with the action and the date. A closure of a software alert is left out, because it belongs to the settings list rather than to the checked key.
## Development
The web server, validation, alert rules, export, and database use Python's standard library. The server serves only explicitly listed static assets. Keep application data local; never add fields for seed phrases, private keys, wallet passwords, cloud credentials, or contact details.
The application UI, source code, comments, and technical documentation are in English. `TODO.md` is intentionally written in Norwegian, and it is the only document in the repository that is. The product name **VardKey** and the database file name **`data/vardkey.sqlite3`** are English, like the rest of the repository.
Stored status values are English. The seed backup result is `OK` or `PROBLEM`; software compatibility is `OK` or `PROBLEM` for a check that could be performed; the security statuses are `SECURE`, `PATCHED`, `VULNERABLE`, and `COMPROMISED`; the contact confirmation is `Confirmed current` or `Needs external update`. `NOT_ASSESSED` is only ever the derived `software_compatibility_status` of a key that could not be checked, and no other field offers or accepts it.
The provider and the wallet software are the configured key name and the selected software, so those columns hold free text. The database does not limit them to the products that shipped with the first version, and the wallet software choices come from the settings list and the configured cloud keys.
The address path is a public derivation path and holds no secret. It is part of a key's identity, so the setup records it, the check form compares the recorded path with it, the settings may only change it while the key has no saved check, and no two keys may share one. The comparison ignores surrounding whitespace and letter case, and the rule lives in the validation layer, which is what the `400` and `409` answers are built on.
The type is part of the identity of a key too, so the setup locks it and the settings never change it. Only a rotation, which replaces the key with a new one, may pick the other type. A key that becomes a cloud key offers its own name as a wallet software choice, so a name the settings list already holds is refused with `409`: the same name cannot be both a cloud key and a settings entry, and the user has to remove that entry first. The rule lives in the validation layer as well.
An alert names the actions that close it, and the acknowledgement stores the action name in `reason`. The actions are fixed per alert code and source, so no alert can be closed by an action it does not offer, and no alert can be left without one. An acknowledgement also stores the key the alert belonged to, so an alert that belongs to a key stays closed across a rename, and the closures that belong to a key can be listed in the history and the export.
The schema is version 11. `keys.address_path`, the `wallet_software` table, and the `alert_acknowledgements` table were added, the two derived cloud results were dropped from `key_checks`, and `alert_acknowledgements.key_id` was added. The application is still under development, so no data migration is written for an older database: delete the `data` folder and configure the setup again. Databases created by earlier versions are still migrated on startup where the older migrations exist:
- The removed columns are dropped, and the old boolean verification flags become `OK`/`PROBLEM`.
- The Norwegian security status values become the English ones.
- `IKKJE_VURDERT` becomes `NOT_ASSESSED`.
- The old `0`/`1` contact flag becomes `Confirmed current` (was `1`) or `Needs external update` (was `0`), and an empty value stays empty.
- The fixed `device` column, the fixed product and provider lists, and the fixed wallet-software list are dropped, because the configured key name and the selected software replace them.
- The `tool_checks` table is dropped, together with the BIP327/SLIP39 results it held. It is a child table, so the drop needs no rebuild of a parent table, and the rest of the history is kept.
- The two derived cloud results are dropped from `key_checks`, and a key that predates the address path starts with an empty one.
- `alert_acknowledgements.key_id` is added to a database that predates version 11. An acknowledgement written before the change has no key, and the older contact alert used the source `Contact information`, which no longer matches; an acknowledgement from before the change is therefore not carried over, and the alert it closed is raised again. No data migration is written for it, because the database is a test database.
Because `health_checks` is a parent table with foreign keys from the child tables, the migration disables foreign keys for the transaction, checks them with `PRAGMA foreign_key_check` before committing, and rolls back if anything is wrong. Older records keep rendering in the history.
Making the rest of a check optional for an unavailable key, and for a key whose address path does not match, needs no migration: `wallet_software` is already nullable, and the security results live in their own table. A record with no such rows simply renders and exports as empty.
The address path uniqueness, the type change on a rotation, and the alert actions need no migration either: all are enforced where they are used, and a database with a duplicate path is refused by the API rather than by a constraint, so an old database can still be opened.