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AI Agent Note — Helsesjekk

Short working handover for the next model. Keep it short.

  • TODO.md (Norwegian) is the requirement specification. Sections 1–18 are the binding spec; sections 19–27 are short summaries of the rounds. The full reasoning is in the git history.
  • The binding rules live in TODO.md and README.md. This note does not repeat them — it carries the handover, the rules that are easy to get wrong, and the traps that already cost time.
  • HANDOVER.md was deleted as outdated. Do not recreate it.

Status

  • Done and verified: sections 19–26 and section 18 steps 1–8. Schema version 10. 319 green tests.
  • Next work: section 27 — alert closures in the history and the CSV, the contact alert on the key card, and replace_hardware for a cloud-key wallet software. Not started. The schema goes to version 11.
  • After that: section 18 steps 9–12 — the StartOS package, the persistent volume, backup/restore, and .s9pk. Covered by sections 13, 14, 16 and 17 of TODO.md. Do not start the StartOS part before the user says so.
  • Verified how: the automated suite and the user's manual browser testing. The remaining manual tests are the ones in section 16 of TODO.md; the StartOS test there is still open.
  • Tests: the user runs them: python3 -m unittest discover -s tests. They run on a Windows copy at C:\Users\Driftsleiar\Downloads\helsesjekk, so they must pass there as well as on Linux.
  • Future work, deliberately not built: more than three keys, and another threshold than 2-of-3.

Section 27 — the next round

Read section 27 of TODO.md first. TODO.md is already updated, so start with the code. Work one file at a time, in this order:

  1. alerts.py
  2. database.py
  3. app.py
  4. export.py
  5. static/history.js
  6. static/app.js (only the last bullet below)
  7. tests/test_alerts.py, tests/test_database.py, tests/test_app.py, tests/test_export.py, tests/test_health_check_form.py
  8. README.md
  9. ai-note.md

What changes:

  • Blocking. An alert that belongs to a key blocks that key until the alert is closed. That now includes contact_info_unconfirmed, which has severity info. blocking_alert() in app.py and the blockingAlerts filter in static/health-check.js already match on key_id, so no blocking code changes: the rule is satisfied by giving the two alerts below a key_id.
  • The contact alert belongs to a key. key_id is the checked key, source becomes Key N: <name> (the convention the key alerts already use), and the message names the key: The contact details for Key 1: SeedSigner need an external update. Update them in your external documentation, then close this alert. Severity stays info and the action stays contact_updated.
  • software_incompatible gets two forms. When the recorded wallet_software is the name of a configured cloud key: key_id is the checked key, source is Key N: <name>, and the actions are [replace_hardware]. Otherwise it stays as it is: key_id is None, source is the software name (or _SOFTWARE_SOURCE), and the actions are [remove_software]. The reason for the split: a cloud key name can never be removed from the settings — validate_wallet_software refuses it — so remove_software would be a dead end and the alert could never be closed.
  • The acknowledgement stores the key. alert_acknowledgements gets a new, nullable key_id column (INTEGER, no FK, no CHECK). Schema version 11: bump SCHEMA_VERSION, add the column to ALERT_ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS_TABLE and to OPTIONAL_COLUMNS so ALTER TABLE ... ADD COLUMN migrates an older database. No table rebuild is needed, and save_alert_acknowledgement() takes key_id as a new argument. software_alert_targets() returns (code, source, key_id) triples.
  • Alert identity. An alert with a key_id is acknowledged and hidden by (code, key_id); an alert without one stays as it is, by (code, source). This fixes a real bug: _is_acknowledged() matches on source, which contains the name the key has now, so a rotate with keep_name=false — or a plain rename in the settings — writes an acknowledgement with the old name and then rebuilds the alert with the new one, and the closed alert reappears. No test covers it today, because the rotation tests that raise an alert keep the name.
  • Closures in the history and the CSV. Closures with a key_id (that is rotate, replace_hardware, contact_updated, and ignore with a key as its source) must be visible in GET /api/health-checks/<id> and in the CSV export. remove_software and a software-sourced ignore must not be visible. A closure is attached to the check that it closed, through check_id.
    • Add an optional check_id filter to list_alert_acknowledgements() and assemble the payload in app.py. The detail view gets a closed_alerts list with code, source, action and acknowledged_at.
    • static/history.js gets a new card, Follow-up closed, with one line per closure: code, source, the action written out as a readable label, and the date. The action labels have to be duplicated in that file, which is the existing pattern (see ACTION_LABELS in app.js and health-check.js).
    • The CSV gets one new column, last: Follow-up closed, with code: action (YYYY-MM-DD); ... in one cell per check — the same joining pattern Security status already uses.
  • One frontend change in static/app.js. A key card with an open alert must keep showing Last checked and Next check due; the alert note comes in addition, not instead. Today the dates disappear, which costs the user the dates for a key whose only alert is the informational contact one.

Traps in section 27

  • The cloud_names trap. alerts.py cannot tell that Nunchuk is a cloud key from the record alone, so build_alerts()/collect_alerts() need a new optional parameter, cloud_names=(), threaded through rotation_alert_targets(), software_alert_targets(), and the four call sites in app.py (_send_alerts, _blocking_alert, _rotate_key, _close_removed_software) plus newest_alert_check_id(). If newest_alert_check_id() does not receive exactly the same cloud_names as collect_alerts(), the alert's source differs, the acknowledgement stores check_id = None, _is_acknowledged() refuses to hide an alert without a check id, and the alert can never be closed. Write a comment about it and cover it with a test.
  • Keep the default cloud_names=() on build_alerts(), or every existing call in the tests breaks.
  • A legacy record saved before section 19 can hold up to three key_checks. Use the first one to find the key, and say so in a comment.
  • A test breaks by design: AppHandlerTests.test_alerts_api_merges_identical_alerts_and_keeps_the_newest uses the contact alert precisely because it carried no key and never blocked. Rework it, for example by acknowledging between the two submissions.
  • The old source value Contact information disappears. Acknowledgements written before the change no longer match; that is acceptable, because the project writes no data migration for a test database, but it must be said in this note and in README.md.
  • Windows: keep closing sqlite3 connections explicitly with try/finally. with sqlite3.connect(...) only commits or rolls back, and the file stays locked so TemporaryDirectory.cleanup() fails with WinError 32.

Tests to add or change for section 27

  • tests/test_alerts.py: the contact alert's key_id, source and message; a cloud-key software → [replace_hardware] plus a key_id; a settings-list software → unchanged; an acknowledgement matched by key_id after the name changed; the regression test for a rotation with a new name. These three mention Contact information as the source and must be updated: test_contact_details_that_need_an_external_update_are_reported, AlertActionTests.test_the_agreed_actions_are_offered_for_each_code_and_source, and test_an_acknowledgement_covers_one_code_and_source_only.
  • tests/test_database.py: version 11 in test_initialization_creates_versioned_schema_and_is_idempotent; a new SCHEMA_VERSION_10 literal with a migration test, following the pattern of the older ones; save_alert_acknowledgement() with key_id; list_alert_acknowledgements(check_id=...); the closure cell in list_export_rows.
  • tests/test_app.py: the history detail holds the closure and leaves out remove_software; the CSV cell; the contact alert blocks with 409 and frees the key at contact_updated; the cloud-key software flow end to end; the rotation regression.
  • tests/test_export.py: the new column is last, and the joined cell reads back.
  • tests/test_health_check_form.py: the new history card.

Deliberately left out

remove_software is a dead end in two more places today, both outside what the user asked for: a software-sourced security_vulnerable still offers remove_software next to ignore (so it stays closable, but one of the buttons leads nowhere), and a software-sourced security_compromised offers remove_software as its only action, so an alert whose "software" is a cloud key name can never be closed. Not fixed in section 27.

Rules that are easy to get wrong — do not re-open

  • One submission records one key. There is no "round" grouping, and each key's next check is its own date plus one calendar year, computed on the server and not editable in the form.
  • A key that could not be checked records nothing else. That covers available = 0 and a recorded address path that does not match. wallet_software and ai_security_checks must be empty; a non-empty value is a 400, not something dropped silently. Nothing is stored for them, and software_compatibility_status becomes NOT_ASSESSED.
  • Availability is required and offers only Yes/No. A cloud key collects only Availability; its compatibility is derived from it, and its own name is the wallet software.
  • A hardware key needs an explicit compatibility status, and Hardware works needs an explicit Yes or No. A missing value, "" and NOT_ASSESSED are all a 400.
  • The contact confirmation is required for every submission, including one for a key that could not be checked, and it has no "not assessed" value.
  • NOT_ASSESSED is not offered or accepted anywhere else. No field but the derived software_compatibility_status accepts it.
  • Address path verified is never a form field again. The server derives it from the comparison. The stored column stays, so the history, the export and the alerts keep working.
  • The address path is locked after the first saved check, and no two keys may share one — in the setup, in the settings or in a rotation.
  • An alert is closed by the user, not by a newer check. A newer check that raises nothing does not clear an older alert, and a key with an open alert cannot get a new check at all.
  • An acknowledgement stores the action name, not a free reason, and only the actions the endpoint performs are accepted. rotate has its own endpoint, because it requires a new address path.
  • The export is plain CSV only. XLSX is not built and the app does not promise Excel compatibility.
  • The prohibition lists in sections 1 and 13 of TODO.md stay unticked. They are standing prohibitions, to be re-confirmed before release.
  • Whether a date is overdue is decided in the browser, so /api/key-status stays independent of the current date.
  • /api/previous-values still returns a security map that nothing consumes any more, and its address_path per key is no longer used by the form, which pre-fills the path from keys.address_path. Both are deliberate: removing them would shrink the endpoint, but nothing breaks while they stay.

Data model (schema version 11 after section 27)

  • keys: key_number (1–3), name, type (hardware/cloud), address_path, created_at. There is no device column. The name is editable in the settings; the type and the address path are the identity of the key, and the path must be unique across the three rows.
  • health_checks: checked_at, next_check_due, wallet_software, software_version, software_compatibility_status, software_comments, contact_info_verified, comments, plus the legacy sparrow_version / nunchuk_version. wallet_software and contact_info_verified are free text.
  • key_checks: one row per submission — available, hardware_works, firmware_version, seed_backup_verified, address_path_verified, address_path, comments. The two cloud columns are gone.
  • ai_security_checks: provider (free text), status, comments, with UNIQUE (health_check_id, provider).
  • wallet_software: name, created_at. Stored whole, seeded with Sparrow Wallet when the list is empty, never emptied through the API.
  • alert_acknowledgements: code, source, key_id (section 27), check_id, reason, acknowledged_at. reason holds the action name that closed the alert, and key_id holds the key the alert belonged to, or NULL for a software alert from the settings list.
  • tool_checks no longer exists.
  • Startup migration rebuilds keys when it still has device, key_checks when it uses the old layout or still holds the two cloud columns, and health_checks and key_checks when their CHECK constraints still allow the old values. It then drops tool_checks if it is there, and adds the new columns through OPTIONAL_COLUMNS.
  • The table definitions are {table} templates, so a rebuild can create the same table under a temporary name. health_checks is a parent table, so the whole migration runs with PRAGMA foreign_keys = OFF, checks PRAGMA foreign_key_check before committing, and rolls back on any failure.
  • tests/test_database.py carries LEGACY_SCHEMA, SCHEMA_VERSION_5, SCHEMA_VERSION_8 and SCHEMA_VERSION_9 as literal older schemas. Copy that pattern for a new migration test: write the old schema, run initialize_database(), then assert on the migrated rows.
  • There is no data migration for an older test database: the user deletes the data folder and configures the setup again.

API

Pages: /, /setup, /settings, /health-check, /history. Endpoints: GET /health, GET /api/setup, POST /api/setup, GET /api/keys, GET /api/key-status, GET /api/previous-values, GET /api/settings, POST /api/settings/keys, POST /api/settings/wallet-software, POST /api/keys/<id>/rotate, GET /api/health-checks, GET /api/health-checks/<id>, GET /api/alerts, POST /api/alerts/acknowledge, GET /api/export, POST /api/health-checks. Field details are in README.md.

Five things that are easy to break:

  • New static files must be added to STATIC_FILES in app.py, or they return 404. That includes /settings and /settings.js.
  • /api/setup, /api/settings, /api/alerts, /api/key-status and /api/previous-values are extra endpoints that are not in the minimum list in section 11.
  • STORAGE_ERRORS in app.py includes RuntimeError, because list_keys() raises it for a partial setup. Keep it there, or a broken database answers with a traceback instead of a 500.
  • The settings, rotation and acknowledgement endpoints keep the same error handling as the existing ones: a bad payload is a 400, an unknown key or alert is a 404, a locked or duplicate address path is a 409, and a broken database is a 500. DuplicateAddressPath must be caught before the general ValidationError in _save_key_settings, or the 409 turns into a 400.
  • newest_alert_check_id() in app.py derives the check id for the acknowledgement, the rotation and the software removal, so the same comparison rule is used in all three places. blocking_alert() is the module-level helper the 409 is built on, and _blocking_alert() reads the key id straight from the payload, so the rule applies before validation.

Traps that already cost time — do not repeat

  • with sqlite3.connect(...) does not close the connection. It only commits or rolls back the transaction. On Windows the database file stays locked and TemporaryDirectory.cleanup() fails with WinError 32. Always close explicitly with try/finally; see write_schema() in tests/test_database.py.
  • A required control inside a display:none container still blocks submission. The browser refuses to submit and logs "An invalid form field is not focusable". Hiding a section is not enough: the required flags must be cleared, or the section must render something other than required fields. That is why renderSecurityChecks() shows an empty note instead of cards when a key could not be checked, why syncUncheckableState() clears the flags on the wallet software and the compatibility select — also for a cloud key, whose grid is hidden — and why syncRequiredFields() clears the flag on hardware_works and seed_backup_verified. The rotation path field follows the same rule: it is disabled until the key is selected, and the script refuses to send an empty one.
  • The mismatch confirmation follows its warning. #address-path-confirmed is required only while #address-path-warning is visible, so the browser itself stops the submission and a required control is never hidden.
  • The page heading uses class="eyebrow" too. A regex over health-check.html finds Annual security check before the numbered sections, and settings.html starts with Settings. A test on the section order must expect that first.
  • Do not assert on the quoting style of the JavaScript. static/health-check.js uses single quotes for constant selectors and template literals where a ${...} substitution is needed, and static/settings.js uses double quotes. Assert on the selector text, e.g. [name="address_path"], and on quote-free substrings such as /api/settings and /settings?rotate=.
  • clean_record() in tests/test_alerts.py has a fixed provider list and carries key_id and wallet_software. A test that needs another provider must replace the entry itself, and the recorded software is Sparrow Wallet, which is what a software alert names.
  • sample_payload() / unavailable_payload() are duplicated in tests/test_validation.py, tests/test_database.py and tests/test_app.py. They build the labels from the key's name and the selected software, they always send contact_info_verified, and for a hardware key hardware_works. They must send the key's own address_path, because the server compares it with the stored one.
  • Every test fixture uses one address path per key (ADDRESS_PATH, SECOND_ADDRESS_PATH, THIRD_ADDRESS_PATH), because the setup refuses duplicates. tests/test_app.py also has ROTATION_PATHS and the rotate() helper, which picks an unused path per key so a test can rotate several keys in one run.
  • validate_health_check() takes a third argument. The wallet software list from the settings must be passed in, or a hardware key that selects a settings name is refused. tests/test_validation.py and tests/test_database.py wrap it in a small validate() helper for that reason.
  • tests/test_app.py has six test classes. ServerTestCase starts the server, AppHandlerTests stores the default setup in setUp, RenamedSetupTests stores the renamed one, SettingsApiTests, RotationApiTests and AcknowledgementApiTests store the default one, and KeySetupApiTests leaves the database empty. A new test must go in the class whose setup it needs.
  • Section 19 records one key per submission, so a Check id in the export can cover up to three keys only for rows saved before section 19.

Product clarification

The key's configured name is its product label, and a cloud key's name is also a wallet-software choice. A hardware key name is never a wallet-software choice, and a cloud key records its own name as its software. A key is identified by its type and its address path, while the name is only a label that the user may change. The address path is unique per key, and a rotation replaces the key with a new one that must carry a new address path. A rotation creates a new wallet, so the funds have to be moved from the old multisig setup to the new one before the old keys are discarded. An alert is closed by the user with the action that belongs to it, and a key with an open alert cannot be checked until the alert is closed.