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# AI Agent Note — VardKey
Short working handover for the next model. Keep it short.
- `TODO.md` (Norwegian) is the requirement specification. Sections 1–18 are the binding spec; 19–31 are history; section 32 is the round in progress. The full reasoning is in the git history.
- The binding rules live in `TODO.md` and `README.md`. This note does not repeat them — it carries the handover, the rules that are easy to get wrong, and the traps that already cost time.
- `HANDOVER.md` was deleted as outdated. Do not recreate it.
## Status
- **Done and verified:** sections 1–31 and section 18 steps 1–11. **Section 32.2, the UI pass with the retro theme, and the SVG half of section 32.1, the icon, are also done**, together with **section 32.4, the bug report** (round 32-A and round 32-B) and **section 32.3, the alert and page texts**. Schema version 12. **485 green tests.** The StartOS package is built, sideloaded and running on a StartOS 0.4.0 box; the package version is still `0.1.0:0`.
- **What is left of section 32:** the two PNG icons at 192 and 512 px (they need a rasterizer), 32.6 the documentation drift, and 32.5 the raise to `1.0.0:0` together with section 18 step 12. 32.6 has to come after 32.1–32.2 and before 32.5. One item inside 32.4 is left to the user: **BR-003** — read the 32.4 section below before acting on it, because the report's own wording for it is out of date.
- **A round stops when it is done.** Do not start the next item unless the user asks.
- **Verified how:** the automated suite, the user's manual browser testing, and the install and test round on a StartOS 0.4.0 box. The user runs the suite; the agent has no shell.
- **Tests:** `python3 -m unittest discover -s tests`. They run on a Windows copy at `C:\Users\<brukarnamn>\Downloads\helsesjekk`, so they must pass there as well as on Linux.
- **Known gap, still open, folded into 32.6:** `docs/application.md` and `README.md` still describe the API as it was before section 31 — no login/session endpoints, no gating or CSRF rule, the old maintenance command name, the undated export name, and now also the two new summary fields and the moved field reminder. The documentation conflict in the bug report (BR-004) covers the same ground.
## Section 32 — what is left
- **32.1 The icon — done for the SVG, open for the PNGs.** `icon.svg` at the root and `static/icon.svg` are the same retro drawing: a raised grey window with the navy title bar and three keys. The root file is 1.3 KiB, well under the 40 KiB cap, and it is plain SVG with no font, image or network reference, so the `default-src 'self'` CSP holds. `/icon.svg` was already in `STATIC_FILES`, in the manifest's `icons` entry and in the service worker's allow-list, so no path is new. **What is left:** the 192 and 512 px PNGs, which need a rasterizer the agent does not have. The user rasterizes `static/icon.svg`, adds both to the manifest's `icons` entry with `sizes` and `type: "image/png"`, adds the paths to `STATIC_FILES` in `app.py` and to the allow-list in `static/sw.js`, and updates `tests/test_pwa.py`. The placeholder with `sizes: "any"` is a fine place to stop.
- **32.2 UI polish — done.** See the round 32.2 section below. The only thing left for the user is the manual browser pass on a narrow phone.
- **32.3 Alert and page texts — done.** See the round 32.3 section below.
- **32.4 The bug report — done.** See the section below for what each finding turned out to be.
- **32.6 The documentation drift.** `README.md`, `docs/application.md`, `instructions.md`, `UPDATING.md`, `AGENTS.md` and the package's own i18n strings are all behind the code. `TODO.md` §32.6 lists what is wrong in each. It answers the rest of BR-004, and it must be done after 32.1–32.2 and before 32.5, so the documents describe the released state.
- **32.5 The version raise.** `0.1.0:0` → `1.0.0:0`, once the items above are done and the user says so. No schema change, no new endpoint, no new feature. `startos/versions/` stays empty, because the app migrates its own schema.
## Round 32.2 — the UI pass and the retro theme
`static/styles.css` was rewritten as a Windows application of the mid-1990s: background `#c0c0c0`, fields `#ffffff`, dark edge `#808080`, darkest `#000000`, a navy `#000080` title bar with white text, and no radius, shadow or gradient anywhere. Depth comes from two-tone bevels only. Headings are title bars, buttons are raised and go sunken on `:active`, fields are sunken wells, focus is the classic `outline: 1px dotted #000000`, and the tables are a 1 px grid. The responsive rules and every selector the scripts and the tests rely on are unchanged, including the exact string `.rotation-list { margin-top: 22px; }`.
- **`theme-color` and the manifest move together.** The five pages, `/login` and `theme_color`/`background_color` in `static/manifest.webmanifest` are all `#c0c0c0` now, and `tests/test_pwa.py` asserts that.
- **The key card changed shape.** The number and the type share the top line (`01 · Hardware` via `keyTypeLabel()`), the type has no line of its own, the path stands alone in italics (`.key-path`) with no `Address path:` prefix, the model is a line of its own under the name with no `Model:`/`Service:` prefix and is **left out entirely when it only repeats the key's name** (`sameLabel()` normalizes case and whitespace), and only `Next check due` is shown — `Last checked` is gone. `tests/test_key_status.py` and `tests/test_health_check_form.py` pin the new order, so a fourth line or a reordered card breaks them.
- **The dashboard heading is dynamic.** `p#setup-shape` in `index.html` carries the fallback `Bitcoin Health Monitor for a Multisig Setup.`, and `renderSetupHeading()` in `app.js` replaces it with `Bitcoin Health Monitor for a ${threshold}-of-${key_count} Multisig Setup.` from `/api/setup`. The static description and the whole `section.setup-card` are gone, and `setupTitle`, `setupDescription` and `renderSetupShape()` were removed with them, so no `null` reference is left. **The manifest description stays `Bitcoin Multisig Health Monitor`** (section 29) — only the dashboard line is dynamic. `tests/test_app.py` asserts that the dashboard no longer contains the static description.
- **The field reminder moved.** `Never paste a seed phrase or a private key here.` now stands **once**, as a `p.secret-warning` above the whole key list in `setup.html`. It is gone from `health-check.html` (3 static fields), `health-check.js` (3), `settings.js` (2) and `setup.js` (one per card). `secretWarning()` no longer exists in `setup.js` at all. The server is untouched: `secret_guard.py`, `validation.py` and `auth.py` still refuse a secret in every free-text field. `WarningTests` in `tests/test_secret_guard.py` was rewritten to pin the new rule, and `TODO.md` §2, §12 and §15 were reworded.
- **Two review lists went.** `Needs assessment` is gone from the Review summary in `health-check.js` (the form itself shows what is missing), and so is the `Key N: … · Check date: … · Next check due: …` line. `Results requiring follow-up` stays, and `tests/test_health_check_form.py` now asserts `assertNotIn("Needs assessment", script)`.
- **The history list card changed.** It shows the date, `Key N: <name>` for each key (from the new `key_names`), and one short status, `All OK` or `Needs follow-up` (from the new `needs_follow_up`). `Next check due` and the `Software` text are gone from the card; the read-only detail view keeps every field it had.
- **The two new summary fields are additive.** `GET /api/health-checks` still returns everything `list_health_checks()` returns and adds `key_names` (the name each key has now, in the same order as `key_numbers`) and `needs_follow_up` (whether that check raised anything to follow up, from `build_alerts()` — the same rules the dashboard uses). `needs_follow_up` is a property of the saved check itself, so closing an alert or renaming the key later does **not** change it; that is deliberate and pinned by `test_the_history_list_marks_a_check_that_needs_follow_up`. The enrichment lives in `app.py`'s `_send_health_check_list`, so `database.py` is untouched.
- **The tables stay inside the page.** `table-layout: fixed` and `overflow-wrap: break-word` on `.detail-table`, plus a smaller font and tighter padding in the `max-width: 700px` query, keep `Security status` and `Follow-up closed` from running off a narrow screen. CSS only, no new JavaScript.
- **`Local service` and `Your data stays local.` are gone** from the top bar and the footer on all six pages, including `/login`.
- **Tests:** `tests/test_health_check_form.py` (+6), `tests/test_app.py` (+2, one renamed), `tests/test_secret_guard.py` (WarningTests rewritten, same count), `tests/test_key_status.py` (one test renamed and extended) and `tests/test_pwa.py` (colours). The suite went from 477 to 485.
## Section 32.4 — the bug report, as it turned out
`BUG-RAPPORT-AI-AGENT.md` carries the full verdicts at the end. In short:
- **BR-001 — false positive.** The source files are in `main` and tracked by Git. The report was written from the repository's web view, not from a checkout.
- **BR-002 — confirmed and fixed** (round 32-B). See the guard section below. The user has since confirmed by hand that a seed phrase is stopped in the name field and in the address path field.
- **BR-003 — the report's wording is out of date; what is left of it belongs to §32.** The report says the manual end-to-end pass is still open, but it quotes a §31 text that no longer exists, and §16 and §17 record that the manual browser pass and the box tests were run and verified through §31. What is actually outstanding is the **new** manual work §32 adds — the icon (32.1), the UI pass and the retro theme (32.2), the alert texts (32.3), and the whole box test again after the changes (32.5) — plus the user's confirmation that they have been run. Do not re-verify what §16 and §17 already record as done.
- **BR-004 — falls away.** `AI-STATUS.md` and `DATA-MODEL.md` do not exist in this repository, so there is no conflicting pair to reconcile. The real documentation drift is 32.6.
- **BR-005 — verified in code, no behaviour change.** Only `GET /health`, `GET /api/session` and `/login` are open; every other `/api/*` answers `401` and the pages answer `302` to `/login`; every state-changing POST needs a session and the CSRF token (`403`). The `Secure` cookie attribute is deliberately left off, because StartOS terminates TLS and proxies plain HTTP into the container. The report itself says not to change `app.py` behaviour for this one.
- **BR-006 — confirmed and fixed.** The CSV export neutralizes a text cell a spreadsheet would read as a formula.
- **BR-007 — confirmed and fixed.** The service worker only stores a successful, same-origin, non-redirected response.
- **BR-008 — confirmed and fixed.** The address-path comparison is canonical.
- **The report was written against a different file set.** It asks for `SECURITY.md`, `PRIVACY.md`, `THREATMODEL.md`, `PLATFORM-ACCESS.md`, `ENCRYPTION.md`, `OFFLINE.md`, `AI-STATUS.md` and `DATA-MODEL.md`; none of them exist here. Do not create them.
- **The counts in the report were partly wrong and are corrected there.** Round 32-A added ten tests, not eight, and `tests/test_secret_guard.py` holds 43, not 44: 5 wordlist tests, 10 detection tests, 17 field-level tests, 6 warning tests and 5 API tests. The suite went from 422 to 475, which is the number the user confirmed. Round 32.3 added two more — one in `tests/test_alerts.py` and one in `tests/test_health_check_form.py` — and round 32.2 added eight, for 485.
## Round 32.3 — the alert texts and the page texts
The eleven rows in `TODO.md` §7 (eight codes, two of which have a key form and a software form) now read alike in shape: what is wrong, which key or software it is about, and what closes the alert. `code`, severity, `source`, the actions and the `software` field are unchanged. The shape is written down in §7, so a new alert follows it.
- **The source names the key or the software, so the message does not repeat it.** `source` is either `Key N: <name>` or the software name, and it is shown right above the message in the alert list, in brackets on the key card and in front of the message in the form's blocking note. That is why the messages say "this key". The one exception is the cloud-key form of `software_incompatible`: its source is the key, so its message names the software.
- **The two forms of a security code carry their own message.** `_VULNERABLE_MESSAGE` and `_COMPROMISED_MESSAGE` were split into `_VULNERABLE_KEY_MESSAGE` / `_VULNERABLE_SOFTWARE_MESSAGE` and `_COMPROMISED_KEY_MESSAGE` / `_COMPROMISED_SOFTWARE_MESSAGE`, because the key form is closed by a rotation and the software form by removing the software.
- **Two more constants were pulled out of `_key_alerts`:** `_HARDWARE_FAILURE_MESSAGE` and `_SEED_BACKUP_MESSAGE`. `_SOFTWARE_INCOMPATIBLE_KEY_MESSAGE` is a template with `{software}`.
- **"Replace the key" is gone** where the only action offered is `rotate`. **"PROTOCOL 3: key loss" and "follow the key loss procedure" are gone too** — neither term is defined anywhere in the app or the documents, so they pointed at a concept the user does not have.
- **The contact alert no longer names the key in its message.** It says "this key"; the source carries the name.
- **The remaining duplication is deliberate:** the action appears in the message, on the button in the alert list and in the form's `Close it with: …` line. The button and the note say what the user can press; the message has to stand alone when it is read without them.
- **The blocking `409` message no longer prints the internal code.** It reads "This key has an open alert. Close the alert before recording a new check."
- **The page texts that went with it:** the duplicated `Multisig setup` eyebrow in `index.html`, the duplicated `Settings` eyebrow in `settings.html`, the duplicated `Sign in` heading in `login.html`, the blocked-key help line in `health-check.html` that repeated the note above it, the static `#software-help` text that the script overwrote before it was ever read, the two `Removing an entry…` helps in `settings.html` that became one paragraph, the `Open settings` wording in `setup.js` that is now `Open the settings` like the dashboard's, and the repeated privacy sentence in `app.js`'s `setupDescription`. `validation.py`'s "a configured cloud key already provides this wallet software name" is now "this name already comes from a configured cloud key".
- **Not merged on purpose:** `ACTION_LABELS` / `ACTION_CONFIRMATIONS` stay in three copies (`static/app.js`, `static/health-check.js`, `static/history.js`). They are identical today; a shared file would have to be added to `STATIC_FILES` in `app.py` and to the allow-list in `static/sw.js`.
- **`UNAVAILABLE_MESSAGE` in `health-check.js` stays**, even though the section it is rendered into is hidden for a key that could not be checked. It is the defensive render, and a test pins it.
## Round 32-B — the wallet-secret guard
`secret_guard.py` is the one place that decides whether a piece of text looks like a wallet secret. It is local (no network call), silent (the text never reaches a log, a message, or an exception), and narrow (it matches only the shapes that are unmistakable, so an ordinary note is not refused).
- **What it recognises:** a PEM private-key block; an extended private key with any SLIP-132 prefix (`xprv`, `yprv`, `zprv`, `tprv`, `uprv`, `vprv`) at 100 base58 characters or more; a WIF key (51 or 52 base58 characters starting `5`, `9`, `K`, `L` or `c`); a BIP38 key (`6P`, 58 characters); and a run of 12 or more consecutive BIP39 words, also in the middle of a sentence.
- **What it returns:** a short English label such as `"a seed phrase"`, never the value. `rejection_message(field, label)` builds the sentence the user sees, and it never repeats the value either.
- **The wordlist is embedded**, 2048 words, from `bitcoin/bips` `bip-0039/english.txt`. It is data, not a dependency, and the app still makes no network call. **`tests/test_secret_guard.py` checks the list**: 2048 words, alphabetical, 3–8 lower-case letters, and no two words sharing their first four letters. That last check is the strong one — the specification guarantees it, so a mistyped or missing word breaks it. Do not edit the list without that test.
- **Where it is wired in:** `validation.py` calls `_reject_secret()` from the four text helpers `_text`, `_key_name`, `_model` and `_required_path`, so every free-text field is covered by construction — the key name, the model, the wallet software name, the software version, the firmware version, the four comment fields, and the address path. `auth.py` checks the admin username the same way.
- **The refusal is a `ValidationError`.** `SecretDetected` subclasses it, so the existing handlers answer `400`. Had it been a plain `ValueError`, `STORAGE_ERRORS` would have caught it and answered `500`.
- **`app.py` needed no change at all.** Do not add a handler for this.
- **The password is deliberately not checked.** A long passphrase is a legitimate password, and refusing one would lock the user out of their own account.
- **The guard runs before the field's length limit.** A seed phrase pasted into a 60-character label field is answered with "looks like a seed phrase", not with "too long" — the other order would invite the user to shorten a seed phrase instead of removing it. The limit is still the outer bound and still applies to everything the guard lets through. **This order is deliberate and pinned by tests; do not swap it back.**
- **The reminder in the UI changed in 32.2.** Round 32-B put `Never paste a seed phrase or a private key here.` next to every free-text field, with the class `.secret-warning` in `static/styles.css`. It now stands **once**, above the whole key list in `static/setup.html`, and nowhere else; the per-card and per-field copies are gone. The server side is unchanged. **The page notice is not the same thing and stays** on `health-check.html`, `setup.html` and `settings.html`. `tests/test_secret_guard.py`'s `WarningTests` pins the new rule: one `class="secret-warning"` in `setup.html`, none in the check form or the settings, and no `secretWarning` in `setup.js`.
- **The limitations are documented in the module docstring and are not to be played down:** a bare 64-character hex string is not refused (it is indistinguishable from a transaction id, which is legitimate note content); only the English wordlist is used; a secret split across several fields, or in a shape outside the patterns, is not caught; and a false positive is possible for a note that happens to be twelve or more BIP39 words in a row.
## Section 31 — the points before version 1 (done)
Seven points, done in the order 7, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 6 — the data model first, because everything else builds on it. The icon was split out into section 32.
- **Schema 12.** `app_settings` (`multisig_threshold`, `multisig_key_count`, `admin_username`, `admin_password_hash`, `session_secret`) and a nullable `keys.model`. The `key_number` CHECK was loosened through a table rebuild with `PRAGMA foreign_keys = OFF` and `PRAGMA foreign_key_check` before commit.
- **The admin login.** `auth.py` is the only place that knows the credential: `hashlib.scrypt` with a random salt per password, a signed session cookie (HMAC-SHA256 over an expiry, keyed by `session_secret`, no session table), and a double-submit CSRF token. Every route except `GET /health` needs a session: `401` on the API, a redirect to `/login` on the pages, and a CSRF requirement on every state-changing POST.
- **`maintenance.py`**, with `delete-all-data` and `set-admin-password`.
- **The installable PWA**, without offline data: `static/sw.js` (an allow-list of shell paths only), `static/manifest.webmanifest`, `static/icon.svg`, the registration and offline state in `static/app.js`, and the manifest link on the five pages.
- **The flexible threshold** (`2 ≤ key_count ≤ 15`, `1 ≤ threshold ≤ key_count`), still for **one** setup only.
- **The dated export name**, `YYYY-MM-DD-vardkey-export.csv`. The `download` attribute in `static/index.html` was removed, because one with a value overrides the server's `Content-Disposition` filename.
## Section 30 — the StartOS package
The package is one service: one daemon, one container, one SQLite database on the persistent `main` volume, mounted at `/data`. No Postgres, no Redis, no external backend, no extra container. The decisions are in `TODO.md` section 30.
- **The application and the package share one repository, at the root.** That is a deliberate deviation from the guide's "a package repo is not a fork of the application": the rule assumes a published upstream image or a git submodule, and VardKey has neither. `AGENTS.md` states the deviation so nobody adds an `upstream-project/` submodule to "fix" it.
- **Anything the `Dockerfile` does not `COPY` is not in the image.** The modules go in with `COPY *.py ./` and the assets with `COPY static ./static`; `.dockerignore` keeps `tests`, `data`, `node_modules`, `javascript` and the build output out of the context. `static/` must be copied: `app.py` answers `/health` from code, but every page is read from `ROOT/static`, so an image without it reports a healthy service whose whole UI answers `404`.
- **Three things must agree.** `startos/utils.ts` holds `uiPort` (8080); `startos/main.ts` passes it as `PORT` and uses it in the readiness URL; `startos/interfaces.ts` binds it. Change one alone and the readiness check never goes green. The `DATABASE_PATH` constant in the same file is what puts the database on the volume. The readiness check is `checkWebUrl` against `http://127.0.0.1:8080/health` — and `/health` must stay open, or StartOS reports the service as unhealthy. A red `ECONNREFUSED 127.0.0.1:8080` blip before `VardKey listening on port 8080` is just the first poll landing before Python has bound the socket; nothing to fix.
- **Two actions**, registered through `Actions.of()` in `startos/actions/index.ts`, with their strings in `startos/i18n/dictionaries/`: `deleteAllData.ts` (`delete-all-data`) and `setAdminPassword.ts` (`set-admin-password`). Both run `maintenance.py` in a `withTemp` subcontainer, behind a confirmation the handler enforces. The generated password never travels into the container: `maintenance.py` generates it there and prints it, which is the packaging guide's own password-reset pattern.
- **Backups.** `startos/backups.ts` is `sdk.Backups.ofVolumes('main')`. StartOS stops the service for the duration of a backup, so the database file is quiescent while it is copied — the open question section 30 raised needed no snapshot hook, and it is not a known limitation.
- **No CI.** The guide assumes GitHub Actions; this repository is on Gitea, so there are no `.github/workflows/` and there must not be any. The `.s9pk` is built locally with `make`.
- **The skeleton** (`package.json`, `tsconfig.json`, `Makefile`, `.prettierrc`, `startos/sdk.ts`, `startos/index.ts`, `startos/i18n/`, `startos/fileModels/.gitkeep`, `assets/.gitkeep`) was written to match the Start9 template rather than generated by `s9pk init-workspace`, because that command was not available where it was written. The successful build and install confirm they are equivalent; `@start9labs/start-sdk` is pinned to `3.0.4`.
- **The root `icon.svg` is the package artwork.** Nothing in `startos/` names it; the build reads it from the repository root. It is the same retro drawing as `static/icon.svg`, and it must stay under 40 KiB.
- **Documentation layout.** `README.md` is the StartOS package README, with the guide's fixed heading set. The application's own reference moved to `docs/application.md`, which `instructions.md` links to under `## Documentation`. `AGENTS.md` is the repo-specific agent context, and `CLAUDE.md` is the one-line `@AGENTS.md` import. Both `README.md` and `docs/application.md` are behind the code — see the gap under Status.
## Alerts, closures and key identity — the parts that are easy to get wrong
The rules are in `TODO.md` §7; these are the traps that have already cost time.
- **The acknowledgement stores the key.** `alert_acknowledgements.key_id` is nullable and holds the key the alert belonged to, or `NULL` for a software alert raised by the settings list. An alert with a key is acknowledged and hidden by `(code, key_id)`; an alert without one stays on `(code, source)`. This closed a real bug: a rename — or a `rotate` with `keep_name=false` — used to reopen a closed alert, because `source` carries the name the key has *now*.
- **The contact alert belongs to the checked key.** It gets `key_id` and `source` = `Key N: <name>`, and its message says "this key" and no longer repeats the name (round 32.3). The severity stays `info` and the action stays `contact_updated`. It blocks its key like every other key alert, because `blocking_alert()` and the `blockingAlerts` filter in the form only look at `key_id`. A record without a key check raises no contact alert at all.
- **`software_incompatible` has two forms.** A software from the settings list keeps `source` = the software name, `key_id` = `None`, actions `[remove_software]`, and carries `software`. A wallet software that is the name of a configured cloud key can never be removed from the settings, so that form belongs to the checked key instead: `key_id` = the checked key, `source` = `Key N: <name>`, actions `[replace_hardware]`, and **no** `software` value, so a settings removal can never close it. Only that form names the software in its message, because its source is the key.
- **`alerts.py` needs the cloud key names.** `build_alerts()` and `collect_alerts()` take `cloud_names=()`, threaded through `rotation_alert_targets()`, `software_alert_targets()`, and the four call sites in `app.py` (`_send_alerts`, `_blocking_alert`, `_rotate_key`, `_close_removed_software`), plus `newest_alert_check_id()`. `app.cloud_key_names(keys)` builds the tuple. If `newest_alert_check_id()` does not get exactly the same names as `collect_alerts()`, the alert's `source` differs, the acknowledgement stores `check_id = None`, `_is_acknowledged()` refuses to hide an alert without a check id, and the alert can never be closed. Keep the default `()` on `build_alerts()`. `_send_health_check_list()` passes the same tuple for its `needs_follow_up` field, for the same reason.
- **The closures that belong to a key are shown.** `app.closed_alerts()` and `database._grouped_closures()` both filter on `key_id IS NOT NULL`, so a rotation, a replaced hardware, an updated contact, and an ignored key alert are listed, while `remove_software` and a software-sourced `ignore` are not. `GET /api/health-checks/<id>` returns them as `closed_alerts`, and the CSV has one last column, `Follow-up closed`, with `code: action (YYYY-MM-DD)`, hanging on the check it closed through `check_id`.
- **The key card shows the next due date with the alert note.** `createKeyCard()` in `static/app.js` always renders `Next check due` and adds the alert note on top. `Last checked` was dropped in 32.2, but the note still comes in addition to the date, never instead of it — that is what cost the dates once before, for a key whose only alert was the informational contact one.
- **The type is part of a key's identity.** The setup locks it, the settings never change it, and only a rotation may pick the other one: `POST /api/keys/<id>/rotate` takes an optional `type`, and leaving it out keeps the current type. `save_key_settings(..., key_type=None)` uses `COALESCE(?, type)`, so the settings and a rotation share one statement.
- **A key that becomes a cloud key must not take a taken name.** A cloud key offers its own name as a wallet software choice, and the settings list holds the other choices, so a name the list already holds is refused with `409` through `WalletSoftwareNameInUse` — a `ValidationError` subclass, so it has to be caught before the general `ValidationError` in `_rotate_key`, or the `409` turns into a `400`. `validate_rotation()` therefore takes the wallet software list as a fourth argument.
- **A rename needs no rotation and no confirmation.** In the rotation section the name can be changed on its own through `POST /api/settings/keys`, for any key, and the address path of a key with **no** saved check can be changed there the same way. Marking a key with `Rotate this key` and ticking the confirmation box sends it through the rotate endpoint instead, together with the type and the new path. The single button is `Save keys`.
### Deliberately left out
`remove_software` is still a dead end in two places: a software-sourced `security_vulnerable` offers it next to `ignore` (so the alert stays closable, but one button leads nowhere), and a software-sourced `security_compromised` offers it as its only action, so an alert whose "software" is a cloud key name can never be closed. Neither is fixed.
## Rules that are easy to get wrong — do not re-open
- **One submission records one key.** There is no "round" grouping, and each key's next check is its own date plus one calendar year, computed on the server and not editable in the form.
- **A key that could not be checked records nothing else.** That covers `available` = `0` and a recorded address path that does not match. `wallet_software` and `ai_security_checks` must be empty; a non-empty value is a `400`, not something dropped silently. Nothing is stored for them, and `software_compatibility_status` becomes `NOT_ASSESSED`.
- **`Availability` is required and offers only Yes/No.** A cloud key collects only `Availability`; its compatibility is derived from it, and its own name is the wallet software.
- **A hardware key needs an explicit compatibility status**, and `Hardware works` needs an explicit `Yes` or `No`. A missing value, `""` and `NOT_ASSESSED` are all a `400`.
- **The contact confirmation is required** for every submission, including one for a key that could not be checked, and it has no "not assessed" value.
- **`NOT_ASSESSED` is not offered or accepted anywhere else.** No field but the derived `software_compatibility_status` accepts it.
- **`Address path verified` is never a form field again.** The server derives it from the comparison.
- **The address path is locked after the first saved check**, and no two keys may share one — in the setup, in the settings or in a rotation. The comparison is canonical: `m/48h/0h/0h/2h` and `m/48'/0'/0'/2'` are the same path, and the stored spelling is never rewritten.
- **The type is locked by the setup**, and only a rotation may change it. The settings never take a `type`, and a rename alone is not a rotation.
- **An alert is closed by the user, not by a newer check.** A newer check that raises nothing does not clear an older alert, and a key with an open alert cannot get a new check at all.
- **An acknowledgement stores the action name, not a free reason**, and only the actions the endpoint performs are accepted. `rotate` has its own endpoint, because it requires a new address path.
- **The export is plain CSV only.** XLSX is not built and the app does not promise Excel compatibility. The column names and the column order are an agreement; do not change them. A text cell that a spreadsheet would read as a formula is neutralized with a leading apostrophe, and that is the only change a cell may receive.
- **The PWA cache stores only a valid shell answer.** `isCacheable()` in `static/sw.js` requires `response.ok`, `response.type === "basic"` and `!response.redirected`, so a login page (or an error page) can never replace the cached shell. The allow-list is the other half: the worker never names `/api/*`, `/health` or `/login`.
- **A free-text field refuses a wallet secret, and the guard runs before the length limit.** See the 32-B section above. The refusal is a `ValidationError`, the message never repeats the value, and the password is not checked. The reminder that says so is one line in the key setup, not one per field (32.2).
- **Every alert message says what is wrong, which key or software, and what closes it**, and it does not repeat the name in `source` — except the cloud-key form of `software_incompatible`. See the round 32.3 section above and `TODO.md` §7.
- **The two new summary fields are additive and mean what they say.** `key_names` follows `key_numbers`; `needs_follow_up` is a property of the saved check, so it does not change when an alert is closed or a key is renamed. Do not "fix" it to follow `collect_alerts()`, which hides acknowledged alerts and would rewrite history.
- **The prohibition lists** in sections 1 and 13 of `TODO.md` stay unticked. They are standing prohibitions, to be re-confirmed before release — with the one amendment for the installable PWA.
- **Whether a date is overdue is decided in the browser**, so `/api/key-status` stays independent of the current date.
- **`/api/previous-values` still returns a `security` map** that nothing consumes any more, and its `address_path` per key is no longer used by the form, which pre-fills the path from `keys.address_path`. Both are deliberate: removing them would shrink the endpoint, but nothing breaks while they stay.
- **`delete_all_data()` deletes the checks before the keys.** `key_checks.key_id` is `ON DELETE RESTRICT`, so the other order fails. The acknowledgements are deleted explicitly, because they have no foreign key at all.
## Data model (schema version 12)
- `keys`: `key_number` (1–`multisig_key_count`), `name`, `type` (`hardware`/`cloud`), `model`, `address_path`, `created_at`. There is no `device` column. The name is editable in the settings; the type and the address path are the identity of the key, the path must be unique across the rows, and the type only changes through a rotation. `model` is optional documentation and is not locked.
- `health_checks`: `checked_at`, `next_check_due`, `wallet_software`, `software_version`, `software_compatibility_status`, `software_comments`, `contact_info_verified`, `comments`, plus the legacy `sparrow_version` / `nunchuk_version`. `wallet_software` and `contact_info_verified` are free text.
- `key_checks`: one row per submission — `available`, `hardware_works`, `firmware_version`, `seed_backup_verified`, `address_path_verified`, `address_path`, `comments`. The two cloud columns are gone.
- `ai_security_checks`: `provider` (free text), `status`, `comments`, with `UNIQUE (health_check_id, provider)`.
- `wallet_software`: `name`, `created_at`. Stored whole, seeded with `DEFAULT_WALLET_SOFTWARE` (`Sparrow Wallet`) when the list is empty, never emptied through the API. `delete_all_data()` empties it, and the seed puts the default back.
- `alert_acknowledgements`: `code`, `source`, `key_id`, `check_id`, `reason`, `acknowledged_at`. `reason` holds the action name that closed the alert, and `key_id` holds the key the alert belonged to, or `NULL` for a software alert from the settings list.
- `app_settings`: `name` (PRIMARY KEY), `value`. Holds `multisig_threshold`, `multisig_key_count`, `admin_username`, `admin_password_hash` and `session_secret`. `delete_all_data()` removes the two multisig rows, so the 2-of-3 default applies again, and keeps the three credential rows.
- `tool_checks` no longer exists.
- Startup migration rebuilds `keys` when it still has `device` or the old `key_number` CHECK, `key_checks` when it uses the old layout or still holds the two cloud columns, and `health_checks` and `key_checks` when their `CHECK` constraints still allow the old values. It then drops `tool_checks` if it is there, and adds the newer columns through `OPTIONAL_COLUMNS`.
- The table definitions are `{table}` templates, so a rebuild can create the same table under a temporary name. `health_checks` is a parent table, so the whole migration runs with `PRAGMA foreign_keys = OFF`, checks `PRAGMA foreign_key_check` before committing, and rolls back on any failure.
- `tests/test_database.py` carries `LEGACY_SCHEMA`, `SCHEMA_VERSION_5`, `SCHEMA_VERSION_8`, `SCHEMA_VERSION_9`, `SCHEMA_VERSION_10` and `SCHEMA_VERSION_11` as literal older schemas. Copy that pattern for a new migration test: write the old schema, run `initialize_database()`, then assert on the migrated rows.
- There is **no data migration** for an older test database: the user deletes the `data` folder and configures the setup again. An acknowledgement written before version 11 has no key, and the older contact alert used the source `Contact information`, which no longer matches, so the alert it closed is raised again. Section 29 renamed the database file for the same reason, and the old file is discarded with the rest.
## API
Pages: `/`, `/setup`, `/settings`, `/health-check`, `/history`, `/login`. Endpoints: `GET /health`, `GET /api/session`, `POST /api/admin`, `POST /api/login`, `POST /api/logout`, `GET /api/setup`, `POST /api/setup`, `GET /api/keys`, `GET /api/key-status`, `GET /api/previous-values`, `GET /api/settings`, `POST /api/settings/keys`, `POST /api/settings/wallet-software`, `POST /api/keys/<id>/rotate`, `GET /api/health-checks`, `GET /api/health-checks/<id>`, `GET /api/alerts`, `POST /api/alerts/acknowledge`, `GET /api/export`, `POST /api/health-checks`. Field details are in `docs/application.md` — which is behind the code, see the gap under Status.
`GET /api/health-checks` returns each summary with `id`, `checked_at`, `next_check_due`, `software_compatibility_status`, `wallet_software`, `contact_info_verified`, `comments`, `key_numbers`, and the two added in 32.2: `key_names` and `needs_follow_up`.
Maintenance commands, run inside the container by the StartOS actions and usable by hand: `maintenance.py delete-all-data` and `maintenance.py set-admin-password`. Neither is an HTTP endpoint.
The rotate payload is `replaced` + `keep_name` + `name` + `type` + `address_path`, and `type` is optional. `GET /api/health-checks/<id>` also returns `closed_alerts`. The settings page has two sections, and `POST /api/settings/keys` is what a rename alone goes through.
Five things that are easy to break:
- New static files must be added to `STATIC_FILES` in `app.py`, or they return `404`. That includes `/settings`, `/settings.js`, `/login`, `/login.js`, `/session.js`, `/sw.js`, `/manifest.webmanifest` and `/icon.svg`.
- `/api/setup`, `/api/settings`, `/api/alerts`, `/api/key-status`, `/api/previous-values` and `/api/session` are extra endpoints that are not in the minimum list in section 11.
- `STORAGE_ERRORS` in `app.py` includes `RuntimeError`, because `list_keys()` raises it for a partial setup. Keep it there, or a broken database answers with a traceback instead of a `500`. It also includes `ValueError`, so `validate_admin_credentials()` has to be called in its own `try` and mapped to a `400` before the storage handler — and it is why a refused secret has to be a `ValidationError` rather than a bare `ValueError`.
- The settings, rotation and acknowledgement endpoints keep the same error handling as the existing ones: a bad payload is a `400`, an unknown key or alert is a `404`, a locked or duplicate address path is a `409`, and a broken database is a `500`. `DuplicateAddressPath` and `WalletSoftwareNameInUse` must be caught before the general `ValidationError` — in `_save_key_settings` and `_rotate_key` respectively — or the `409` turns into a `400`. A missing or invalid session is a `401`, and a missing CSRF token is a `403`.
- `newest_alert_check_id()` in `app.py` derives the check id for the acknowledgement, the rotation and the software removal, so the same comparison rule is used in all three places. `blocking_alert()` is the module-level helper the `409` is built on, and `_blocking_alert()` reads the key id straight from the payload, so the rule applies before validation.
## Traps that already cost time — do not repeat
- **`with sqlite3.connect(...)` does not close the connection.** It only commits or rolls back the transaction. On Windows the database file stays locked and `TemporaryDirectory.cleanup()` fails with `WinError 32`. Always close explicitly with `try`/`finally`; see `write_schema()` in `tests/test_database.py`.
- **A module the image is missing is a runtime error, not a build error.** `auth.py` was left out of the `Dockerfile` because the module list was written before it existed, and both `app.py` and `maintenance.py` then died with `ModuleNotFoundError` inside the container while every test stayed green. The `COPY *.py ./` line is what stops that recurring. After any change to the image, check the modules, not just the tests. `secret_guard.py` is covered by the same line.
- **Every server test module needs a session, and a redirect makes a missing one look like a pass.** A page fetched without a session answers `302 → /login`, and `urllib` follows it, so an assertion on page markup reads the login page's HTML instead of failing with `401`. Use `tests/server_session.py`'s `SessionMixin`, and note that the manifest and the icon are open while the pages are not.
- **`urlopen` raises `HTTPError` on a 4xx.** A test that expects a `400` has to catch it and read the body from the exception; `tests/test_secret_guard.py`'s `post_status()` helper is the pattern.
- **A field has a length limit, and the guard runs before it.** A test that pastes an 80-character seed phrase into a 60-character label field gets a secret refusal, not a length refusal. Use a WIF key (52 characters) or a BIP38 key (58) when a test needs a secret that *fits* a short field, and use the seed phrase where the field has room. Both sides are pinned in `tests/test_secret_guard.py`.
- **A `required` control inside a `display:none` container still blocks submission.** The browser refuses to submit and logs "An invalid form field is not focusable". Hiding a section is not enough: the required flags must be cleared, or the section must render something other than required fields. That is why `renderSecurityChecks()` shows an empty note instead of cards when a key could not be checked, why `syncUncheckableState()` clears the flags on the wallet software and the compatibility select — also for a cloud key, whose grid is hidden — and why `syncRequiredFields()` clears the flag on `hardware_works` and `seed_backup_verified`. The rotation fields follow the same rule: the type is `disabled` until the key is marked for rotation, the path is `disabled` when the key has a saved check and is not marked, and the script refuses to send an empty path. The login page sidesteps it with two separate forms, so only the visible one is ever validated.
- **The mismatch confirmation follows its warning.** `#address-path-confirmed` is `required` only while `#address-path-warning` is visible, so the browser itself stops the submission and a required control is never hidden.
- **The per-field secret reminder is gone; only the setup keeps one.** It used to be a `<span>` built in JavaScript (`settings.js` put it inside a `.field` label, where a `<p>` is not allowed) with `display: block` and `font-weight: 400` so it looked right in both places. Since 32.2 it is a single `p.secret-warning` in `setup.html`, and `setup.js`, `health-check.js` and `settings.js` no longer build one at all. A test asserts `setup.html` holds exactly one `class="secret-warning"` and that the check form and the settings hold none, so re-adding a per-field copy breaks it.
- **`static/health-check.js` must not use `placeholder` anywhere.** A test asserts the string is absent, because a previous value is a real input value.
- **The key card's line order is pinned by two test modules.** `tests/test_key_status.py` asserts `card.append(top, name)` → `card.append(model)` → `card.append(path)`, and `tests/test_health_check_form.py` asserts that the top line is `${String(entry.key_number).padStart(2, "0")} · ${keyTypeLabel(entry.type)}`, that `card.append(type)` is gone, and that the model line is skipped by `sameLabel(entry.model, entry.name)`. Adding a line, reordering them, or dropping `sameLabel()` breaks them.
- **The dashboard heading is dynamic and the static description is gone.** `tests/test_app.py` asserts `id="setup-shape"` and the fallback text on the dashboard and `assertNotIn("Bitcoin Multisig Health Monitor")` there, while `tests/test_pwa.py` still asserts that exact description in the manifest. Do not move the one into the other.
- **`make x86` runs `prettier --check startos`, and the config is the SDK's own.** `.prettierrc` is the single line `"@start9labs/start-sdk/prettier.config.json"`, which is `{ trailingComma: "all", tabWidth: 2, semi: false, singleQuote: true }` — everything else is prettier's default, so `printWidth` is 80 and `quoteProps` is `"as-needed"`. That last one silently unquotes a single-word i18n key (`Username: 21`, not `'Username': 21`), and 80 columns decides when an array element or an argument collapses onto one line. Write it the way prettier would, or run `npx prettier --config node_modules/@start9labs/start-sdk/prettier.config.json --write startos`.
- **The page heading uses `class="eyebrow"` too.** A regex over `health-check.html` finds `Annual security check` before the numbered sections. `settings.html` starts with the `h1` `Settings`, then `01 / Wallet software` and `02 / Key rotation` — the eyebrow that repeated the `h1` was removed in round 32.3. `tests/test_health_check_form.py` asserts those two lists **exactly**, so a new eyebrow on either page breaks it, and so does a removed one: update the list in the same change. The 32-B warnings deliberately used `class="secret-warning"`, not an eyebrow.
- **A static help line that the script overwrites is dead text.** `#software-help` in `health-check.html` was emptied in round 32.3, because `lockSoftwareFields()` fills it before the user can read it. `static/health-check.js` must keep setting it — the wording depends on the selected key. A test pins both halves: the empty element in the markup and `softwareHelp.textContent` in the script.
- **`aria-labelledby` may point at the eyebrow.** `login.html`'s first form has no `h2` any more; its `aria-labelledby="login-form-title"` points at the eyebrow `<p>` that carries the same `id`. Do not add a heading back just to have one, and do not drop the `id`.
- **Do not assert on the quoting style of the JavaScript.** `static/health-check.js` uses single quotes for constant selectors and template literals where a `${...}` substitution is needed, and `static/settings.js` uses double quotes. Assert on the selector text, e.g. `[name="address_path"]`, and on quote-free substrings such as `/api/settings` and `/settings?rotate=`.
- **`clean_record()` in `tests/test_alerts.py` has a fixed provider list and carries `key_id` and `wallet_software`.** A test that needs another provider must replace the entry itself, and the recorded software is `Sparrow Wallet`, which is what a software alert names. A test that exercises the cloud-key form of `software_incompatible` has to pass `cloud_names` to `build_alerts()`. The alert texts are asserted there, and **not** in `tests/test_app.py`, which checks the code, the severity, the source, the actions and the `key_id` only — so a message change touches `tests/test_alerts.py` alone.
- **`sample_payload()` / `unavailable_payload()` are duplicated in `tests/test_validation.py`, `tests/test_database.py`, `tests/test_app.py`, `tests/test_maintenance.py` and `tests/test_secret_guard.py`.** They build the labels from the key's name and the selected software, they always send `contact_info_verified`, and for a hardware key `hardware_works`. They must send the key's **own** `address_path`, because the server compares it with the stored one.
- **Every test fixture uses one address path per key** (`ADDRESS_PATH`, `SECOND_ADDRESS_PATH`, `THIRD_ADDRESS_PATH`), because the setup refuses duplicates. `tests/test_app.py` also has `ROTATION_PATHS` and the `rotate()` helper, which picks an unused path per key so a test can rotate several keys in one run.
- **`validate_health_check()` takes a third argument** (the wallet software list), and `validate_rotation()` takes a fourth for the same reason. `tests/test_validation.py` and `tests/test_database.py` wrap the first one in a small `validate()` helper.
- **`tests/test_app.py` has seven test classes.** `ServerTestCase` starts the server and keeps the session and CSRF cookies a sign-in returns; `AppHandlerTests`, `RenamedSetupTests`, `SettingsApiTests`, `RotationApiTests` and `AcknowledgementApiTests` store the default or renamed setup and call `authenticate()`; `AuthApiTests` starts from a database with **no admin** and covers the gating, the first-run admin, the login and logout, and the CSRF check; and `KeySetupApiTests` creates its admin through `POST /api/admin` and otherwise starts from an empty database. A new test must go in the class whose setup it needs. Every request helper sends the cookies and the CSRF header, and `assert_status()` is the one place an error status is expected.
- **The other server test modules share `tests/server_session.py`.** `test_export_filename.py`, `test_key_model.py`, `test_key_status.py`, `test_multisig_setup.py`, `test_pwa.py` and `test_secret_guard.py` mix in `SessionMixin`, which signs in through the API and carries the cookies; each class calls `authenticate()` at the end of its own `setUp`. **A test that switches `DATABASE_PATH` to another file has to call `authenticate()` again**, because the session secret lives in the database, so the old cookie is signed with the wrong secret and every request answers `401`. The mixin resolves the path with `app.get_database_path()`, so the admin lands in the file the server actually reads.
- **Section 19 records one key per submission**, so a `Check id` in the export can cover up to three keys only for rows saved before section 19. A legacy record with several `key_checks` is read through its first one when an alert needs the key it belongs to.
- **The database path default is repeated in sixteen places.** `database.py` carries `database_path="data/vardkey.sqlite3"` as the default of every storage function (fifteen of them), and `app.py` carries it in `get_database_path()`. A missed one makes a single code path read or create the other file, silently. Grep for the old name before and after a rename round.
## Product clarification
The key's configured name is its product label, and a cloud key's name is also a wallet-software choice. A hardware key name is never a wallet-software choice, and a cloud key records its own name as its software. A key is identified by its type and its address path, while the name is only a label that the user may change. The address path is unique per key, and a rotation replaces the key with a new one that must carry a new address path and may carry the other type. A rotation creates a new wallet, so the funds have to be moved from the old multisig setup to the new one before the old keys are discarded. An alert is closed by the user with the action that belongs to it, and a key with an open alert cannot be checked until the alert is closed.