86 lines
9.5 KiB
Markdown
86 lines
9.5 KiB
Markdown
# AI Agent Note — Helsesjekk
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Short working handover for the next model. Keep it short.
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- `TODO.md` (Norwegian) is the requirement specification: sections 1–18 are the spec, sections 19–22 a short appendix with the four decisions taken along the way, and section 23 agreed work that is **not implemented yet** and comes before steps 9–12.
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- The binding rules live in `TODO.md` and `README.md`. This note does **not** repeat them — it carries the handover, the rules that are easy to get wrong, and the traps that already cost time.
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- `HANDOVER.md` was deleted as outdated. Do not recreate it.
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## Status
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- **Done and verified:** sections 19–22 and section 18 steps 1–8. All ticked in `TODO.md`.
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- **Tests:** 123, all passing. The user runs them: `python3 -m unittest discover -s tests` from `/home/snes/start9/helsesjekk`.
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- **Agreed next work, not started:** section 23 — configurable key setup, type-driven checks, dynamic wallet-software choices, form fixes, and the matching migration. Nothing in section 23 is implemented.
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- **Remaining after that:** steps 9–12 — StartOS package, persistent volume, backup/restore, `.s9pk`. Covered by sections 13, 14, 16 and 17 of `TODO.md`.
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## Ground rules
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- English everywhere except `TODO.md`.
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- Read the existing files first. Work one file at a time and finish each file before starting the next.
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- Do not start a new step without asking.
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- The user runs the tests and reports the result. Wait for it.
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- Ask one question at a time, with concrete options.
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- Never add fields for seed phrases, private keys, PINs, passwords, cloud tokens, or contact details. The app records results only.
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- The HTTP tests create their own database and server per test. Keep them order-independent; a shared database already caused one order-dependent failure.
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- Record a new decision in `TODO.md` and this note **before** implementing it, and mark it as not implemented until the tests pass.
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- `gitea_update_file` needs a fresh `preview_id` from `gitea_preview_file` for the same path and content. `gitea_create_file` returns `422` on an existing file.
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## Section 23 — agreed direction, not implemented
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Read section 23 of `TODO.md` for the full list. The parts that are easy to get wrong:
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- **Three keys stay, but the type is free.** Each of the three keys is `hardware` or `cloud` in any combination. More than three keys is future work only.
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- **The user names each key once.** That name is the product label everywhere: form, alerts, history, CSV. Show the key number too where it helps, e.g. `Key 1: ColdCard`, and the name alone where the context already makes the key clear. Names must be unique, and both name and type are **immutable** once setup is saved.
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- **The type decides the checks, never the key number.** Hardware keys use today's key 1 and 2 checks. Cloud keys use the Nunchuk model but display the configured name.
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- **Wallet software choices are `Sparrow` plus the name of each configured cloud key.** Hardware key names are never added to that list. `Nunchuk` therefore appears as a software choice only when a cloud key is actually named Nunchuk.
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- **Setup lives in the same SQLite database as the history.** A new database shows first-run setup. An existing database is migrated from its stored key rows and keeps all history. An unreadable database must raise a clear error and must never be treated as a new installation.
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- **Security status is recorded for the selected key name and the selected wallet software.** The section 20 carry-forward of a third provider's status is removed. Skip duplicate rows when the key name and the software name are the same.
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- **Form fixes:** firmware, address path and software version are prefilled with the previous saved value as a real input value, **not** an HTML placeholder, so an untouched field is saved as it stands; software compatibility requires an explicit `OK` or `PROBLEM` with `Select status` as the initial choice, and `NOT_ASSESSED` is no longer submittable; the contact question covers only the selected key's holder and offers `Confirmed current` / `Needs external update`, where the latter shows a reminder to update the records externally.
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## Rules that are easy to get wrong — do not re-open
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- **One submission records one key.** There is no "round" grouping, and each key's next check is its own date plus one calendar year, computed on the server and not editable in the form.
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- **An unavailable key records nothing else.** When `available` is `0`, `wallet_software`, `tool_checks` and `ai_security_checks` must be empty; a non-empty value is a `400`, not something dropped silently. Nothing is stored for them, and `software_compatibility_status` becomes `NOT_ASSESSED`.
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- **`Availability` is required and offers only Yes/No.** There is no "not assessed" value for it, and the server rejects a payload without it.
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- **Key 3 collects only `Availability`.** Cloud health, "provider operational" and software compatibility are all derived from it.
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- **Security status follows the wallet software choice.** For keys 1 and 2 the third provider is hidden and its last saved status carried forward, and it reappears by itself when that status was `VULNERABLE` or `COMPROMISED`. Section 23 removes this carry-forward, but only once section 23 is implemented.
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- **BIP327 and SLIP39 are `YES`/`NO`/`NOT_ASSESSED`.** Only `YES` raises the informational alert; a reported `NO` is a negative result and raises nothing.
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- **`Address path` is only recorded when `Address path verified` is `OK`.** The form enforces this; the server does not.
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- **`/api/alerts` covers every saved check**, not only the newest, and merges identical alerts by `code` plus `source`. A security alert's `source` is the provider, not the key — so two keys' Nunchuk results merge into one alert, which is intended.
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- **The export is plain CSV only.** XLSX is not built and the app does not promise Excel compatibility.
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- **The prohibition lists** in sections 1 and 13 of `TODO.md` stay unticked. They are standing prohibitions, to be re-confirmed before release.
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- **Readable user-defined key names are not built.** Section 23.2 adds them; the section 3 item stays unticked until then.
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- **Whether a date is overdue is decided in the browser**, so `/api/key-status` stays independent of the current date.
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## Data model (schema version 6)
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- `health_checks`: `checked_at`, `next_check_due`, `wallet_software`, `software_version`, `software_compatibility_status`, `software_comments`, `contact_info_verified`, `comments`, plus the legacy `sparrow_version` / `nunchuk_version`.
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- `key_checks`: one row per submission — `available`, `hardware_works`, `firmware_version`, `seed_backup_verified`, `cloud_health_status`, `cloud_provider_operational`, `address_path_verified`, `address_path`, `comments`.
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- `tool_checks`: `product`, `bip327_status`, `slip39_status`. The legacy `version`, `checked_at`, `notes` are kept for old rows but never written.
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- `ai_security_checks`: `provider`, `status`, `comments`.
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- Startup migration rebuilds `key_checks` and `ai_security_checks` when they still use the old layout, and rebuilds `health_checks`, `key_checks` and `tool_checks` when their `CHECK` constraints still allow `IKKJE_VURDERT`.
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- The table definitions are `{table}` templates, so a rebuild can create the same table under a temporary name. `health_checks` is a parent table, so the whole migration runs with `PRAGMA foreign_keys = OFF`, checks `PRAGMA foreign_key_check` before committing, and rolls back on any failure.
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- Section 23 adds storage for the key setup (name and type) and changes the `contact_info_verified` values. Until then the schema above stands.
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## API
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`GET /health`, `GET /api/keys`, `GET /api/key-status`, `GET /api/previous-values`, `GET /api/health-checks`, `GET /api/health-checks/<id>`, `GET /api/alerts`, `GET /api/export`, `POST /api/health-checks`. Field details are in `README.md`.
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Two things that are easy to break:
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- New static files must be added to `STATIC_FILES` in `app.py`, or they return `404`.
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- `/api/alerts`, `/api/key-status` and `/api/previous-values` are extra endpoints that are not in the minimum list in section 11. They are noted in section 11 but not in the specification itself.
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## Traps that already cost time — do not repeat
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- **A `required` control inside a `display:none` container still blocks submission.** The browser refuses to submit and logs "An invalid form control is not focusable". Hiding a section is not enough: the required flags must be cleared, or the section must render something other than required fields. That is why `renderToolChecks()` and `renderSecurityChecks()` show an empty note instead of cards when the key is unavailable.
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- **Do not assert on the quoting style of the JavaScript.** `static/health-check.js` uses single quotes for constant selectors and template literals where a `${...}` substitution is needed. Assert on the selector text, e.g. `[name="address_path"]`.
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- **`clean_record()` in `tests/test_alerts.py` has a fixed provider list.** A test that needs another provider must replace the entry itself.
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- **Section 19 records one key per submission**, so a `Check id` in the export can cover up to three keys only for rows saved before section 19.
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## Product clarification
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Nunchuk has two roles today: it is the third key and also wallet software. Record only one Nunchuk security status per submission and only one Nunchuk BIP327/SLIP39 row. Sparrow is software only and is checked on every submission.
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Section 23 generalises this: the key's configured name is its product label, and a cloud key's name is also a wallet-software choice. A hardware key name is never a wallet-software choice.
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