174 lines
45 KiB
Markdown
174 lines
45 KiB
Markdown
# AI Agent Note — VardKey
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Short working handover for the next model. Keep it short.
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- `TODO.md` (Norwegian) is the requirement specification. Sections 1–18 are the binding spec; 19–31 are history; section 32 is the round in progress. The full reasoning is in the git history.
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- The binding rules live in `TODO.md` and `README.md`. This note does not repeat them — it carries the handover, the rules that are easy to get wrong, and the traps that already cost time.
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- `HANDOVER.md` and `ai-thought.md` were deleted as outdated. Do not recreate either.
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## Status
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- **Done and verified:** sections 1–31 and section 18 steps 1–11, plus **section 32.1** (the icon), **32.2** (the UI pass and the retro theme), **32.3** (the alert and page texts), **32.4** (the bug report, rounds 32-A and 32-B) and **32.7** (the top-bar menu and the dashboard clean-up), each with its follow-up round. Schema version 12. **513 green tests.** The StartOS package is built, sideloaded and running on a StartOS 0.4.0 box; the package version is still `0.1.0:0`.
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- **What is left:** **32.6 the documentation drift**, and then **32.5 the raise to `1.0.0:0`** together with section 18 step 12. 32.6 has to come after the rounds it documents, and 32.5 last. One item inside 32.4 is left to the user: **BR-003**, a manual end-to-end pass — read the note under 32.4 before acting on it, because the report's own wording for it is out of date. The user's manual pass over the finished §32 work is outstanding as well.
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- **A round stops when it is done.** Do not start the next item unless the user asks.
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- **Verified how:** the automated suite, the user's manual browser testing, and the install and test round on a StartOS 0.4.0 box. The user runs the suite; the agent has no shell.
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- **Tests:** `python3 -m unittest discover -s tests`. They run on a Windows copy at `C:\Users\<brukarnamn>\Downloads\helsesjekk`, so they must pass there as well as on Linux.
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- **Keep this note short.** The finished §32 sub-rounds are one short line each in `TODO.md` §32, and the reasoning is in the git history. A finished round does not need its narrative back, and the two documents should not be rewritten in full every round.
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## Section 32 — what is left
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- **32.6 The documentation drift.** `README.md`, `docs/application.md`, `instructions.md`, `UPDATING.md`, `AGENTS.md` and the package's own i18n strings are all behind the code, and `TODO.md` §32.6 lists what is wrong in each. It answers the rest of BR-004, and it must be done before 32.5, so the documents describe the released state. In one line, what the documents still miss: the login and session endpoints and the gating/CSRF rule, the CSV formula guard, the canonical path comparison, the local secret guard, the two summary fields, the moved field reminder, the added `model` field in the check detail, the icon link and the two PNGs, the top-bar menu, the removed dashboard cards, the export section and its note on the history page, the `#history-detail` anchor, and the robots rule.
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- **32.5 The version raise.** `0.1.0:0` → `1.0.0:0`, once 32.6 is done and the user says so. No schema change, no new endpoint, no new feature. `startos/versions/` stays empty, because the app migrates its own schema.
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### BR-003 — the one open item in 32.4
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The report says the manual end-to-end pass is still open, but it quotes a §31 text that no longer exists, and §16 and §17 record that the manual browser pass and the box tests were run and verified through §31. What is outstanding is the **new** manual work §32 added — the icon, the retro theme on a narrow phone, the alert texts, the top-bar menu, the cleaned dashboard, the export section on the history page, the PWA with the two PNG icons, and the whole box test again after 32.5 — plus the user's confirmation that it has been run. Do not re-verify what §16 and §17 already record as done. The other verdicts are settled: BR-001 is a false positive, BR-004 falls away, BR-005 is verified with no behaviour change, and BR-002, BR-006, BR-007 and BR-008 are fixed with regression tests. The report was written against a different file set and asks for eight documents that do not exist here; do not create them.
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## The wallet-secret guard (round 32-B)
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`secret_guard.py` is the one place that decides whether a piece of text looks like a wallet secret. It is local (no network call), silent (the text never reaches a log, a message or an exception) and narrow (it matches only the shapes that are unmistakable, so an ordinary note is not refused).
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- **What it recognises:** a PEM private-key block; an extended private key with any SLIP-132 prefix (`xprv`, `yprv`, `zprv`, `tprv`, `uprv`, `vprv`) at 100 base58 characters or more; a WIF key (51 or 52 base58 characters starting `5`, `9`, `K`, `L` or `c`); a BIP38 key (`6P`, 58 characters); and a run of 12 or more consecutive BIP39 words, also in the middle of a sentence. It returns a short English label such as `"a seed phrase"`, never the value, and `rejection_message(field, label)` never repeats it either.
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- **The wordlist is embedded**, 2048 words, from `bitcoin/bips` `bip-0039/english.txt`. `tests/test_secret_guard.py` checks it: 2048 words, alphabetical, 3–8 lower-case letters, and no two words sharing their first four letters. That last check is the strong one — the specification guarantees it, so a mistyped or missing word breaks it. Do not edit the list without that test.
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- **Where it is wired in:** `validation.py` calls `_reject_secret()` from the four text helpers `_text`, `_key_name`, `_model` and `_required_path`, so every free-text field is covered by construction. `auth.py` checks the admin username the same way; the password is deliberately not checked, because a long passphrase is a legitimate password and refusing one would lock the user out.
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- **The refusal is a `ValidationError`** (`SecretDetected`), so the existing handlers answer `400`. `app.py` needed no change at all — do not add a handler for this. A plain `ValueError` would have been caught by `STORAGE_ERRORS` and answered `500`.
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- **The guard runs before the field's length limit.** A seed phrase pasted into a 60-character label field is answered with "looks like a seed phrase", not with "too long" — the other order would invite the user to shorten a seed phrase instead of removing it. The limit is still the outer bound. **This order is deliberate and pinned by tests; do not swap it back.**
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- **The reminder in the UI is one line, in the key setup** — a single `p.secret-warning` above the whole key list in `static/setup.html`, and nowhere else; the per-field copies were removed in 32.2. The page notice is a different thing and stays on `health-check.html`, `setup.html` and `settings.html`. The server side is unchanged.
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- **The limitations are documented in the module docstring and are not to be played down:** a bare 64-character hex string is not refused (it is indistinguishable from a transaction id, which is legitimate note content); only the English wordlist is used; a secret split across several fields, or in a shape outside the patterns, is not caught; and a false positive is possible for a note that happens to be twelve or more BIP39 words in a row.
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## Alerts, closures and key identity — the parts that are easy to get wrong
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The rules are in `TODO.md` §7; these are the traps that have already cost time.
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- **The acknowledgement stores the key.** `alert_acknowledgements.key_id` is nullable and holds the key the alert belonged to, or `NULL` for a software alert raised by the settings list. An alert with a key is acknowledged and hidden by `(code, key_id)`; an alert without one stays on `(code, source)`. This closed a real bug: a rename — or a `rotate` with `keep_name=false` — used to reopen a closed alert, because `source` carries the name the key has *now*.
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- **A key-sourced security alert carries `Key N: <name>`.** `build_alerts()` reads the key checks into two lookups — `key_ids` (name → id) and `key_sources` (name → `Key N: <name>`, built with `_key_source()`) — and `_security_alerts()` takes both. When the provider is the key's own configured name, the key is the source and the alert belongs to it, so it is closed by a rotation; otherwise the source is the plain software name and it is closed by removing that software from the settings. **Because the acknowledgement hides a key alert by `key_id`, not by `source`, an alert closed before this change stays closed** — `test_a_key_named_security_alert_is_hidden_by_its_key` pins it. `rotation_alert_targets()`, `software_alert_targets()` and `newest_alert_check_id()` all read the same `build_alerts()`, so they see the same source, which is what keeps an alert closable.
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- **The contact alert belongs to the checked key.** It gets `key_id` and `source` = `Key N: <name>`, and its message says "this key" and does not repeat the name. The severity stays `info` and the action stays `contact_updated`. It blocks its key like every other key alert, because `blocking_alert()` and the `blockingAlerts` filter in the form only look at `key_id`. A record without a key check raises no contact alert at all.
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- **`software_incompatible` has two forms.** A software from the settings list keeps `source` = the software name, `key_id` = `None`, actions `[remove_software]`, and carries `software`. A wallet software that is the name of a configured cloud key can never be removed from the settings, so that form belongs to the checked key instead: `key_id` = the checked key, `source` = `Key N: <name>`, actions `[replace_hardware]`, and **no** `software` value, so a settings removal can never close it. Only that form names the software in its message, because its source is the key.
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- **`alerts.py` needs the cloud key names.** `build_alerts()` and `collect_alerts()` take `cloud_names=()`, threaded through `rotation_alert_targets()`, `software_alert_targets()`, and the four call sites in `app.py` (`_send_alerts`, `_blocking_alert`, `_rotate_key`, `_close_removed_software`), plus `newest_alert_check_id()`. `app.cloud_key_names(keys)` builds the tuple. If `newest_alert_check_id()` does not get exactly the same names as `collect_alerts()`, the alert's `source` differs, the acknowledgement stores `check_id = None`, `_is_acknowledged()` refuses to hide an alert without a check id, and the alert can never be closed. Keep the default `()` on `build_alerts()`. `_send_health_check_list()` passes the same tuple for its `needs_follow_up` field, for the same reason.
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- **The closures that belong to a key are shown.** `app.closed_alerts()` and `database._grouped_closures()` both filter on `key_id IS NOT NULL`, so a rotation, a replaced hardware, an updated contact and an ignored key alert are listed, while `remove_software` and a software-sourced `ignore` are not. `GET /api/health-checks/<id>` returns them as `closed_alerts`, and the CSV has one last column, `Follow-up closed`, with `code: action (YYYY-MM-DD)`, hanging on the check it closed through `check_id`. The history table shows `Alert`, `Action` and `Closed` only — the source is not a column.
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- **The key card shows the next due date with the alert note.** `createKeyCard()` in `static/app.js` always renders `Next check due` and adds the alert note on top. `Last checked` was dropped in 32.2, but the note still comes in addition to the date, never instead of it — that is what cost the dates once before, for a key whose only alert was the informational contact one.
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- **The type is part of a key's identity.** The setup locks it, the settings never change it, and only a rotation may pick the other one: `POST /api/keys/<id>/rotate` takes an optional `type`, and leaving it out keeps the current type. `save_key_settings(..., key_type=None)` uses `COALESCE(?, type)`, so the settings and a rotation share one statement.
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- **A key that becomes a cloud key must not take a taken name.** A cloud key offers its own name as a wallet software choice, and the settings list holds the other choices, so a name the list already holds is refused with `409` through `WalletSoftwareNameInUse` — a `ValidationError` subclass, so it has to be caught before the general `ValidationError` in `_rotate_key`, or the `409` turns into a `400`. `validate_rotation()` therefore takes the wallet software list as a fourth argument.
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- **A rename needs no rotation and no confirmation.** In the rotation section the name can be changed on its own through `POST /api/settings/keys`, for any key, and the address path of a key with **no** saved check can be changed there the same way. Marking a key with `Rotate this key` and ticking the confirmation box sends it through the rotate endpoint instead, together with the type and the new path. The single button is `Save keys`.
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### Deliberately left out
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`remove_software` is still a dead end in two places: a software-sourced `security_vulnerable` offers it next to `ignore` (so the alert stays closable, but one button leads nowhere), and a software-sourced `security_compromised` offers it as its only action, so an alert whose "software" is a cloud key name can never be closed. Neither is fixed.
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## Rules that are easy to get wrong — do not re-open
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- **One submission records one key.** There is no "round" grouping, and each key's next check is its own date plus one calendar year, computed on the server and not editable in the form.
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- **A key that could not be checked records nothing else.** That covers `available` = `0` and a recorded address path that does not match. `wallet_software` and `ai_security_checks` must be empty; a non-empty value is a `400`, not something dropped silently. Nothing is stored for them, and `software_compatibility_status` becomes `NOT_ASSESSED`.
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- **`Availability` is required and offers only Yes/No.** A cloud key collects only `Availability`; its compatibility is derived from it, and its own name is the wallet software.
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- **A hardware key needs an explicit compatibility status**, and `Hardware works` needs an explicit `Yes` or `No`. A missing value, `""` and `NOT_ASSESSED` are all a `400`.
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- **The contact confirmation is required** for every submission, including one for a key that could not be checked, and it has no "not assessed" value.
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- **`NOT_ASSESSED` is not offered or accepted anywhere else.** No field but the derived `software_compatibility_status` accepts it.
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- **`Address path verified` is never a form field again.** The server derives it from the comparison.
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- **The address path is locked after the first saved check**, and no two keys may share one — in the setup, in the settings or in a rotation. The comparison is canonical: `m/48h/0h/0h/2h` and `m/48'/0'/0'/2'` are the same path, and the stored spelling is never rewritten.
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- **The type is locked by the setup**, and only a rotation may change it. The settings never take a `type`, and a rename alone is not a rotation.
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- **An alert is closed by the user, not by a newer check.** A newer check that raises nothing does not clear an older alert, and a key with an open alert cannot get a new check at all.
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- **An acknowledgement stores the action name, not a free reason**, and only the actions the endpoint performs are accepted. `rotate` has its own endpoint, because it requires a new address path.
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- **Every alert message says what is wrong, which key or software, and what closes it**, and it does not repeat the name in `source` — except the cloud-key form of `software_incompatible`. See `TODO.md` §7.
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- **The export is plain CSV only.** XLSX is not built and the app does not promise Excel compatibility. The column names and the column order are an agreement; do not change them. A text cell that a spreadsheet would read as a formula is neutralized with a leading apostrophe, and that is the only change a cell may receive.
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- **The PWA cache stores only a valid shell answer.** `isCacheable()` in `static/sw.js` requires `response.ok`, `response.type === "basic"` and `!response.redirected`, so a login page (or an error page) can never replace the cached shell. The allow-list is the other half: the worker never names `/api/*`, `/health`, `/login` or `/robots.txt`.
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- **No page is meant to be crawled.** All six pages carry `<meta name="robots" content="noindex, nofollow">` in `<head>`, `_send_security_headers()` in `app.py` adds `X-Robots-Tag: noindex, nofollow`, and `static/robots.txt` answers `Disallow: /`. A new page has to carry the meta, and `static/robots.txt` must **not** be added to the service worker's shell list. The header is not sent by `send_error()`, so a `404` and a `500` answer without it — deliberate, because the round asked for the pages, the JSON, a redirect, the CSV and the static files.
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- **The navigation lives in the top bar, not on the page.** `static/session.js` builds the menu, the panel and the `.topbar-actions` wrapper on the five application pages; `/login` has none. The dashboard markup therefore carries no `href` for `/health-check`, `/settings`, `/history` or `/api/export`, and the export link and its note are on the history page. The page the user is already on is a `<span>` with `aria-current="page"`, not a link. Do not add a navigation link back to the dashboard markup: `tests/test_app.py`'s `test_the_dashboard_carries_no_navigation_link_of_its_own` pins it.
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- **The Attention card is the only summary card.** Its detail line carries the overdue list when something is overdue and the earliest due date otherwise; `nextCheckTitle` and `nextCheckDetail` no longer exist, and `.overview-grid` is one column at every width.
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- **An empty alert list renders nothing.** The count beside the heading says `No alerts`; do not put placeholder text back into `#alerts-list`.
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- **The two summary fields are additive and mean what they say.** `key_names` follows `key_numbers`; `needs_follow_up` is a property of the saved check, so it does not change when an alert is closed or a key is renamed. Do not "fix" it to follow `collect_alerts()`, which hides acknowledged alerts and would rewrite history.
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- **The prohibition lists** in sections 1 and 13 of `TODO.md` stay unticked. They are standing prohibitions, to be re-confirmed before release — with the one amendment for the installable PWA.
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- **Whether a date is overdue is decided in the browser**, so `/api/key-status` stays independent of the current date.
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- **`/api/previous-values` still returns a `security` map** that nothing consumes any more, and its `address_path` per key is no longer used by the form, which pre-fills the path from `keys.address_path`. Both are deliberate: removing them would shrink the endpoint, but nothing breaks while they stay.
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- **`delete_all_data()` deletes the checks before the keys.** `key_checks.key_id` is `ON DELETE RESTRICT`, so the other order fails. The acknowledgements are deleted explicitly, because they have no foreign key at all.
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## Data model (schema version 12)
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- `keys`: `key_number` (1–`multisig_key_count`), `name`, `type` (`hardware`/`cloud`), `model`, `address_path`, `created_at`. There is no `device` column. The name is editable in the settings; the type and the address path are the identity of the key, the path must be unique across the rows, and the type only changes through a rotation. `model` is optional documentation and is not locked.
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- `health_checks`: `checked_at`, `next_check_due`, `wallet_software`, `software_version`, `software_compatibility_status`, `software_comments`, `contact_info_verified`, `comments`, plus the legacy `sparrow_version` / `nunchuk_version`. `wallet_software` and `contact_info_verified` are free text.
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- `key_checks`: one row per submission — `available`, `hardware_works`, `firmware_version`, `seed_backup_verified`, `address_path_verified`, `address_path`, `comments`. The two cloud columns are gone.
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- `ai_security_checks`: `provider` (free text), `status`, `comments`, with `UNIQUE (health_check_id, provider)`.
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- `wallet_software`: `name`, `created_at`. Stored whole, seeded with `DEFAULT_WALLET_SOFTWARE` (`Sparrow Wallet`) when the list is empty, never emptied through the API. `delete_all_data()` empties it, and the seed puts the default back.
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- `alert_acknowledgements`: `code`, `source`, `key_id`, `check_id`, `reason`, `acknowledged_at`. `reason` holds the action name that closed the alert, and `key_id` holds the key the alert belonged to, or `NULL` for a software alert from the settings list.
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- `app_settings`: `name` (PRIMARY KEY), `value`. Holds `multisig_threshold`, `multisig_key_count`, `admin_username`, `admin_password_hash` and `session_secret`. `delete_all_data()` removes the two multisig rows, so the 2-of-3 default applies again, and keeps the three credential rows.
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- `tool_checks` no longer exists.
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- Startup migration rebuilds `keys` when it still has `device` or the old `key_number` CHECK, `key_checks` when it uses the old layout or still holds the two cloud columns, and `health_checks` and `key_checks` when their `CHECK` constraints still allow the old values. It then drops `tool_checks` if it is there, and adds the newer columns through `OPTIONAL_COLUMNS`.
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- The table definitions are `{table}` templates, so a rebuild can create the same table under a temporary name. `health_checks` is a parent table, so the whole migration runs with `PRAGMA foreign_keys = OFF`, checks `PRAGMA foreign_key_check` before committing, and rolls back on any failure.
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- `tests/test_database.py` carries `LEGACY_SCHEMA`, `SCHEMA_VERSION_5`, `SCHEMA_VERSION_8`, `SCHEMA_VERSION_9`, `SCHEMA_VERSION_10` and `SCHEMA_VERSION_11` as literal older schemas. Copy that pattern for a new migration test: write the old schema, run `initialize_database()`, then assert on the migrated rows.
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- There is **no data migration** for an older test database: the user deletes the `data` folder and configures the setup again. An acknowledgement written before version 11 has no key, and the older contact alert used the source `Contact information`, which no longer matches, so the alert it closed is raised again. Section 29 renamed the database file for the same reason, and the old file is discarded with the rest.
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## API
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Pages: `/`, `/setup`, `/settings`, `/health-check`, `/history`, `/login`. Endpoints: `GET /health`, `GET /api/session`, `POST /api/admin`, `POST /api/login`, `POST /api/logout`, `GET /api/setup`, `POST /api/setup`, `GET /api/keys`, `GET /api/key-status`, `GET /api/previous-values`, `GET /api/settings`, `POST /api/settings/keys`, `POST /api/settings/wallet-software`, `POST /api/keys/<id>/rotate`, `GET /api/health-checks`, `GET /api/health-checks/<id>`, `GET /api/alerts`, `POST /api/alerts/acknowledge`, `GET /api/export`, `POST /api/health-checks`. Field details are in `docs/application.md` — which is behind the code, see the gap under Status.
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`GET /api/health-checks` returns each summary with `id`, `checked_at`, `next_check_due`, `software_compatibility_status`, `wallet_software`, `contact_info_verified`, `comments`, `key_numbers`, and the two added in 32.2: `key_names` and `needs_follow_up`.
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Maintenance commands, run inside the container by the StartOS actions and usable by hand: `maintenance.py delete-all-data` and `maintenance.py set-admin-password`. Neither is an HTTP endpoint.
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The rotate payload is `replaced` + `keep_name` + `name` + `type` + `address_path`, and `type` is optional. `GET /api/health-checks/<id>` also returns `closed_alerts`, and each of its `key_checks` rows carries `model` as well — the field was added in the follow-up round of 32.1 so the history can show the model and the firmware version on one line, and the fields that were already there keep their names. The settings page has two sections, and `POST /api/settings/keys` is what a rename alone goes through. The `#history-detail` anchor and the `?id=` query on `/history` are client-side only: they never reach the server, so no route changed for them.
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Five things that are easy to break:
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- New static files must be added to `STATIC_FILES` in `app.py`, or they return `404`. That includes `/settings`, `/settings.js`, `/login`, `/login.js`, `/session.js`, `/sw.js`, `/manifest.webmanifest`, `/icon.svg`, the two raster icons `/icon-192.png` and `/icon-512.png`, and `/robots.txt`, which is `text/plain; charset=utf-8` and is deliberately absent from the service worker's shell list.
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- `/api/setup`, `/api/settings`, `/api/alerts`, `/api/key-status`, `/api/previous-values` and `/api/session` are extra endpoints that are not in the minimum list in section 11.
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- `STORAGE_ERRORS` in `app.py` includes `RuntimeError`, because `list_keys()` raises it for a partial setup. Keep it there, or a broken database answers with a traceback instead of a `500`. It also includes `ValueError`, so `validate_admin_credentials()` has to be called in its own `try` and mapped to a `400` before the storage handler — and it is why a refused secret has to be a `ValidationError` rather than a bare `ValueError`.
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- The settings, rotation and acknowledgement endpoints keep the same error handling as the existing ones: a bad payload is a `400`, an unknown key or alert is a `404`, a locked or duplicate address path is a `409`, and a broken database is a `500`. `DuplicateAddressPath` and `WalletSoftwareNameInUse` must be caught before the general `ValidationError` — in `_save_key_settings` and `_rotate_key` respectively — or the `409` turns into a `400`. A missing or invalid session is a `401`, and a missing CSRF token is a `403`.
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- `newest_alert_check_id()` in `app.py` derives the check id for the acknowledgement, the rotation and the software removal, so the same comparison rule is used in all three places. `blocking_alert()` is the module-level helper the `409` is built on, and `_blocking_alert()` reads the key id straight from the payload, so the rule applies before validation.
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## The StartOS package — the parts that bite
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The package is one service: one daemon, one container, one SQLite database on the persistent `main` volume, mounted at `/data`. No Postgres, no Redis, no external backend, no extra container. The decisions are in `TODO.md` section 30.
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- **The application and the package share one repository, at the root.** A deliberate deviation from the guide's "a package repo is not a fork of the application": the rule assumes a published upstream image or a git submodule, and VardKey has neither. `AGENTS.md` states the deviation so nobody adds an `upstream-project/` submodule to "fix" it.
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- **Anything the `Dockerfile` does not `COPY` is not in the image.** The modules go in with `COPY *.py ./` and the assets with `COPY static ./static`; `.dockerignore` keeps `tests`, `data`, `node_modules`, `javascript` and the build output out of the context. `static/` must be copied: `app.py` answers `/health` from code, but every page is read from `ROOT/static`, so an image without it reports a healthy service whose whole UI answers `404`. `static/robots.txt` is served the same way, so it is in the image too.
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- **Three things must agree.** `startos/utils.ts` holds `uiPort` (8080); `startos/main.ts` passes it as `PORT` and uses it in the readiness URL; `startos/interfaces.ts` binds it. Change one alone and the readiness check never goes green. `DATABASE_PATH` in the same file is what puts the database on the volume. The readiness check is `checkWebUrl` against `http://127.0.0.1:8080/health`, and `/health` must stay open, or StartOS reports the service as unhealthy. A red `ECONNREFUSED 127.0.0.1:8080` blip before `VardKey listening on port 8080` is just the first poll landing before Python has bound the socket; nothing to fix.
|
||
- **Two actions**, registered through `Actions.of()` in `startos/actions/index.ts`, with their strings in `startos/i18n/dictionaries/`: `deleteAllData.ts` (`delete-all-data`) and `setAdminPassword.ts` (`set-admin-password`). Both run `maintenance.py` in a `withTemp` subcontainer, behind a confirmation the handler enforces. The generated password never travels into the container: `maintenance.py` generates it there and prints it, which is the packaging guide's own password-reset pattern.
|
||
- **Backups.** `startos/backups.ts` is `sdk.Backups.ofVolumes('main')`. StartOS stops the service for the duration of a backup, so the database file is quiescent while it is copied — no snapshot hook is needed, and it is not a known limitation.
|
||
- **No CI.** The guide assumes GitHub Actions; this repository is on Gitea, so there are no `.github/workflows/` and there must not be any. The `.s9pk` is built locally with `make`.
|
||
- **The skeleton** was written to match the Start9 template rather than generated by `s9pk init-workspace`, because that command was not available where it was written. The successful build and install confirm they are equivalent; `@start9labs/start-sdk` is pinned to `3.0.4`.
|
||
- **The root `icon.svg` is the package artwork**, read from the repository root by the build. It is the same retro drawing as `static/icon.svg`, and it must stay under 40 KiB.
|
||
- **Documentation layout.** `README.md` is the StartOS package README, with the guide's fixed heading set. The application's own reference is `docs/application.md`, which `instructions.md` links to. `AGENTS.md` is the repo-specific agent context, and `CLAUDE.md` is the one-line `@AGENTS.md` import. Both `README.md` and `docs/application.md` are behind the code — that is 32.6.
|
||
|
||
## Traps that already cost time — do not repeat
|
||
|
||
- **`with sqlite3.connect(...)` does not close the connection.** It only commits or rolls back the transaction. On Windows the database file stays locked and `TemporaryDirectory.cleanup()` fails with `WinError 32`. Always close explicitly with `try`/`finally`; see `write_schema()` in `tests/test_database.py`.
|
||
- **A module the image is missing is a runtime error, not a build error.** `auth.py` was once left out of the `Dockerfile`, and both `app.py` and `maintenance.py` then died with `ModuleNotFoundError` inside the container while every test stayed green. The `COPY *.py ./` line is what stops that recurring. After any change to the image, check the modules, not just the tests. `secret_guard.py` is covered by the same line.
|
||
- **Every server test module needs a session, and a redirect makes a missing one look like a pass.** A page fetched without a session answers `302 → /login`, and `urllib` follows it, so an assertion on page markup reads the login page's HTML instead of failing with `401`. Use `tests/server_session.py`'s `SessionMixin`, and note that the manifest, the icons and `/robots.txt` are open while the pages are not.
|
||
- **`urlopen` raises `HTTPError` on a 4xx.** A test that expects a `400` has to catch it and read the body from the exception; `tests/test_secret_guard.py`'s `post_status()` helper is the pattern. A `302` behaves the same way when the opener refuses to follow it, which is how `tests/test_app.py` reads a redirect's headers.
|
||
- **A field has a length limit, and the guard runs before it.** A test that pastes an 80-character seed phrase into a 60-character label field gets a secret refusal, not a length refusal. Use a WIF key (52 characters) or a BIP38 key (58) when a test needs a secret that *fits* a short field, and use the seed phrase where the field has room.
|
||
- **A `required` control inside a `display:none` container still blocks submission.** The browser refuses to submit and logs "An invalid form field is not focusable". Hiding a section is not enough: the required flags must be cleared, or the section must render something other than required fields. That is why `renderSecurityChecks()` shows an empty note instead of cards when a key could not be checked, why `syncUncheckableState()` clears the flags on the wallet software and the compatibility select — also for a cloud key, whose grid is hidden — and why `syncRequiredFields()` clears the flag on `hardware_works` and `seed_backup_verified`. The rotation fields follow the same rule: the type is `disabled` until the key is marked for rotation, the path is `disabled` when the key has a saved check and is not marked, and the script refuses to send an empty path. The login page sidesteps it with two separate forms, so only the visible one is ever validated.
|
||
- **A hidden element has no box, so an anchor cannot jump to it.** `#history-detail` is hidden until a check is opened, so the browser's own `:target` scroll does nothing. `revealDetail()` in `history.js` unhides the section first and only then calls `scrollIntoView()`. Do not reorder those two lines, and do not drop the anchor from the `View` link or from the target in `saveHealthCheck()`.
|
||
- **A bare substring assertion over page markup also catches comments.** `test_the_dashboard_has_no_next_check_card_and_no_history_block` failed on its first run because it asserted `assertNotIn("Next check", html)` and the page carried an HTML comment naming the removed card. It now pins the markup that was actually removed — `<p class="eyebrow">Next check</p>` and the two ids. Assert on the element, not on the phrase; a phrase is also case-sensitive and would trip on any line such as `Next check due`.
|
||
- **A `display: grid` panel ignores the `hidden` attribute.** `.menu-panel` is a grid, so the browser's own `[hidden] { display: none }` loses to it. The sheet carries `.menu-panel[hidden] { display: none; }` for that reason, the same way `.form-stack[hidden]`, `.field-grid[hidden]` and `.form-section[hidden]` already did. Do not drop that rule.
|
||
- **The menu's outside-click listener has to allow the button's own click.** The button's handler runs first and toggles the panel; the document listener then sees a target inside `.menu` and does nothing. Reordering them, or replacing `menu.contains(event.target)` with a check on the panel alone, makes the button close the panel it just opened.
|
||
- **The current-page check compares a normalised path, and the current item is a span.** `currentPath()` strips trailing slashes and keeps the root as `/`, so `/health-check/` matches `/health-check`. The match is rendered as a `<span class="menu-item menu-item-current">` with `aria-current="page"`, never an `<a>` — that is what makes it unclickable. A test asserts the span, the class string and the `aria-current` attribute, so switching back to a disabled link breaks it.
|
||
- **The mismatch confirmation follows its warning.** `#address-path-confirmed` is `required` only while `#address-path-warning` is visible, so the browser itself stops the submission and a required control is never hidden.
|
||
- **The per-field secret reminder is gone; only the setup keeps one.** Since 32.2 it is a single `p.secret-warning` in `setup.html`, and `setup.js`, `health-check.js` and `settings.js` no longer build one at all. A test asserts `setup.html` holds exactly one `class="secret-warning"` and that the check form and the settings hold none, so re-adding a per-field copy breaks it.
|
||
- **`static/health-check.js` must not use `placeholder` anywhere.** A test asserts the string is absent, because a previous value is a real input value.
|
||
- **The key card's line order is pinned by two test modules.** `tests/test_key_status.py` asserts `card.append(top, name)` → `card.append(model)` → `card.append(path)`, and `tests/test_health_check_form.py` asserts that the top line is `${String(entry.key_number).padStart(2, "0")} · ${keyTypeLabel(entry.type)}`, that `card.append(type)` is gone, and that the model line is skipped by `sameLabel(entry.model, entry.name)`. Adding a line, reordering them, or dropping `sameLabel()` breaks them.
|
||
- **The dashboard heading is dynamic and the static description is gone.** `tests/test_app.py` asserts `id="setup-shape"` and the fallback text on the dashboard and `assertNotIn("Bitcoin Multisig Health Monitor")` there, while `tests/test_pwa.py` still asserts that exact description in the manifest. Do not move the one into the other.
|
||
- **The stylesheet test asserts on the shape of the theme, not on its wording.** `test_stylesheet_is_the_retro_theme` checks the two bevel colour pairs, the dotted focus outline, the font stack, the absence of `box-shadow` and `gradient`, and that every `border-radius` in the sheet is `0`. It reads the values, so a restyled rule that keeps the palette passes, and a rounded corner does not. The only `border-radius` in the sheet is the explicit reset to `0`; do not drop it, and do not add a rounded corner anywhere.
|
||
- **The brand mark is an image, and the class name is pinned.** `IconTests` in `tests/test_pwa.py` asserts that all six pages carry `<img class="brand-mark" src="/icon.svg" alt="" aria-hidden="true">`, that the old `<span class="brand-mark" aria-hidden="true">V</span>` is gone, that the sheet holds `image-rendering: pixelated`, and that `place-items: center` appears nowhere. It also pins `min-height: 100vh`, `min-height: 100dvh`, `flex-direction: column` and the exact string `main { flex: 1 1 auto; }`, which is what keeps the footer at the bottom. Do not style the brand mark as a letter again, and do not drop the `main` rule.
|
||
- **The two SVG files must keep the same drawing.** The package icon at the repository root is the source of truth, and `static/icon.svg` is the copy the PWA serves; only the leading comment differs, and `test_the_served_icon_carries_the_same_drawing_as_the_package_icon` compares them from `<svg>` onwards. A change to one drawing has to be made in both.
|
||
- **The two PNGs are real files, rasterized by the user**, because the agent has no rasterizer. `IconTests` reads each file's IHDR and asserts 192×192 and 512×512, so a PNG made at the wrong size fails the suite instead of silently breaking the install prompt.
|
||
- **The manifest lists the SVG first, and the two PNGs after it.** `test_the_manifest_lists_the_served_icon` reads `icons[0]`, so a PNG added in front of the SVG turns the suite red. The PNG entries must carry the real size (`192x192` and `512x512`) and `type: "image/png"`.
|
||
- **The favicon link sits next to the manifest link, and `/login` has no manifest.** `IconTests` asserts the exact string `<link rel="icon" type="image/svg+xml" href="/icon.svg">` on all six pages, so a reworded or reordered link breaks it. `/icon.svg`, the two PNGs and `/robots.txt` are open (they are not in `PROTECTED_PAGES` and do not start with `/api/`), which is what lets the login page, the browser tab and a crawler read them.
|
||
- **`make x86` runs `prettier --check startos`, and the config is the SDK's own.** `.prettierrc` is the single line `"@start9labs/start-sdk/prettier.config.json"`, which is `{ trailingComma: "all", tabWidth: 2, semi: false, singleQuote: true }` — everything else is prettier's default, so `printWidth` is 80 and `quoteProps` is `"as-needed"`. That last one silently unquotes a single-word i18n key (`Username: 21`, not `'Username': 21`), and 80 columns decides when an array element or an argument collapses onto one line. Write it the way prettier would, or run `npx prettier --config node_modules/@start9labs/start-sdk/prettier.config.json --write startos`.
|
||
- **The page heading uses `class="eyebrow"` too.** A regex over `health-check.html` finds `Annual security check` before the numbered sections. `settings.html` starts with the `h1` `Settings`, then `01 / Wallet software` and `02 / Key rotation`. `tests/test_health_check_form.py` asserts those two lists **exactly**, so a new eyebrow on either page breaks it, and so does a removed one: update the list in the same change. The 32-B warnings deliberately used `class="secret-warning"`, not an eyebrow.
|
||
- **A static help line that the script overwrites is dead text.** `#software-help` in `health-check.html` was emptied in round 32.3, because `lockSoftwareFields()` fills it before the user can read it. `static/health-check.js` must keep setting it — the wording depends on the selected key. A test pins both halves: the empty element in the markup and `softwareHelp.textContent` in the script.
|
||
- **`aria-labelledby` may point at the eyebrow.** `login.html`'s first form has no `h2` any more; its `aria-labelledby="login-form-title"` points at the eyebrow `<p>` that carries the same `id`. Do not add a heading back just to have one, and do not drop the `id`.
|
||
- **Do not assert on the quoting style of the JavaScript.** `static/health-check.js` uses single quotes for constant selectors and template literals where a `${...}` substitution is needed, and `static/settings.js` uses double quotes. Assert on the selector text, e.g. `[name="address_path"]`, and on quote-free substrings such as `/api/settings` and `/settings?rotate=`.
|
||
- **`clean_record()` in `tests/test_alerts.py` has a fixed provider list and carries `key_id` and `wallet_software`.** A test that needs another provider must replace the entry itself, and the recorded software is `Sparrow Wallet`, which is what a software alert names. A test that exercises the cloud-key form of `software_incompatible` has to pass `cloud_names` to `build_alerts()`. The alert texts are asserted there, and **not** in `tests/test_app.py`, which checks the code, the severity, the source, the actions and the `key_id` only — so a message change touches `tests/test_alerts.py` alone.
|
||
- **`sample_payload()` / `unavailable_payload()` are duplicated in `tests/test_validation.py`, `tests/test_database.py`, `tests/test_app.py`, `tests/test_maintenance.py` and `tests/test_secret_guard.py`.** They build the labels from the key's name and the selected software, they always send `contact_info_verified`, and for a hardware key `hardware_works`. They must send the key's **own** `address_path`, because the server compares it with the stored one.
|
||
- **Every test fixture uses one address path per key** (`ADDRESS_PATH`, `SECOND_ADDRESS_PATH`, `THIRD_ADDRESS_PATH`), because the setup refuses duplicates. `tests/test_app.py` also has `ROTATION_PATHS` and the `rotate()` helper, which picks an unused path per key so a test can rotate several keys in one run.
|
||
- **`validate_health_check()` takes a third argument** (the wallet software list), and `validate_rotation()` takes a fourth for the same reason. `tests/test_validation.py` and `tests/test_database.py` wrap the first one in a small `validate()` helper.
|
||
- **`tests/test_app.py` has seven test classes.** `ServerTestCase` starts the server and keeps the session and CSRF cookies a sign-in returns; `AppHandlerTests`, `RenamedSetupTests`, `SettingsApiTests`, `RotationApiTests` and `AcknowledgementApiTests` store the default or renamed setup and call `authenticate()`; `AuthApiTests` starts from a database with **no admin** and covers the gating, the first-run admin, the login and logout, the CSRF check and the robots header on a redirect; and `KeySetupApiTests` creates its admin through `POST /api/admin` and otherwise starts from an empty database. A new test must go in the class whose setup it needs. Every request helper sends the cookies and the CSRF header, and `assert_status()` is the one place an error status is expected.
|
||
- **The other server test modules share `tests/server_session.py`.** `test_export_filename.py`, `test_key_model.py`, `test_key_status.py`, `test_multisig_setup.py`, `test_pwa.py` and `test_secret_guard.py` mix in `SessionMixin`, which signs in through the API and carries the cookies; each class calls `authenticate()` at the end of its own `setUp`. **A test that switches `DATABASE_PATH` to another file has to call `authenticate()` again**, because the session secret lives in the database, so the old cookie is signed with the wrong secret and every request answers `401`. The mixin resolves the path with `app.get_database_path()`, so the admin lands in the file the server actually reads.
|
||
- **The export link and its note live on the history page, and four tests moved with them.** `tests/test_export_filename.py` reads `static/history.html` and asserts the dashboard has no `/api/export` link; `tests/test_app.py`'s dashboard test became `test_the_dashboard_carries_no_navigation_link_of_its_own`; `test_the_history_page_offers_the_export_in_its_own_section` in `tests/test_health_check_form.py` pins the `Export` section, the title bar, the note under the button and the absent `.page-heading > .secondary-button` rule; and `test_the_history_links_to_the_detail_section` pins both anchors. A future round that adds a link to the dashboard has to update these, not delete them.
|
||
- **`#key-count` still exists in `setup.html`, but not on the dashboard.** The dashboard's counter span was removed in 32.7; `setup.html` still has the `Key slots` input with `id="key-count"` and `name="key_count"`. The two are on different pages and were never the same element, so assert per file.
|
||
- **Section 19 records one key per submission**, so a `Check id` in the export can cover up to three keys only for rows saved before section 19. A legacy record with several `key_checks` is read through its first one when an alert needs the key it belongs to.
|
||
- **The database path default is repeated in sixteen places.** `database.py` carries `database_path="data/vardkey.sqlite3"` as the default of every storage function (fifteen of them), and `app.py` carries it in `get_database_path()`. A missed one makes a single code path read or create the other file, silently. Grep for the old name before and after a rename round.
|
||
|
||
## Product clarification
|
||
|
||
The key's configured name is its product label, and a cloud key's name is also a wallet-software choice. A hardware key name is never a wallet-software choice, and a cloud key records its own name as its software. A key is identified by its type and its address path, while the name is only a label that the user may change. The address path is unique per key, and a rotation replaces the key with a new one that must carry a new address path and may carry the other type. A rotation creates a new wallet, so the funds have to be moved from the old multisig setup to the new one before the old keys are discarded. An alert is closed by the user with the action that belongs to it, and a key with an open alert cannot be checked until the alert is closed.
|